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RESPONDING TO THE TIME-BASED
FAILURES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
THROUGH A CRIMINAL SUNSET
AMENDMENT
RICHARD E. MYERS II*
Abstract: The libertarian genius of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution
recognized that liberty is defended best when it is difficult to pass a law.
They therefore split power vertically and horizontally—between the states
and the federal government, and among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches—and barred some laws from being passed at all. The
obstructive mechanisms intended to defend liberty, however, also stymie
attempts to restore liberty. This Article proposes a constitutional amend-
ment that would redress that oversight by creating a twenty-five-year limit
on the effect of all criminal legislation. It would force regular legislative ,
oversight of the criminal codes. It would redistribute power among the
branches by reducing the courts' incentives to create new conceptions of
substantive due process to redress perceived process failures. And it would
reset the checks and balances for each generation in favor of liberty. This
Article is intended to provoke a renewed discussion of the issues of gen-
erational entrenchment, overcriminalization, and the structural bases
that result in what Professor William Stunt/ has called "the pathological
politics of the criminal law."
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The earth belongs always to the living generation. . . The constitution
and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course
with those who gave them being. . . Every constitution then, ea" every
law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer; it is an
act of force, & not of right.
—Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789
No criminal law passed by the United Stales or any of the several states may
remain in effect for more than 25 years from its date of passage. . . Any
new criminal law must be passed individually through the republican pro-
cedures of the jurisdiction in which it is to apply.
—Proposed Amendment XXVII
(The Criminal Sunset Amendment)
• INTRODUCTION
The American system of substantive criminal law is in danger of
succumbing to explosive overgrowth, at least according to some critics)
They decry the overbreadth and overdepth of the law, demonstrating
both that there are laws on the books that criminalize behavior we no
longer condemn and that there are too many laws that apply to the be-
havior we do condemn. 2 They point out that we have substituted pro-
cedural protections, judicial intervention, and executive discretion for
careful legislative attention to the substantive criminal larw. 3 As a result,
they say, we are undercutting the perceived legitimacy of the law at
numerous turns, 4
Critical scholars have spent the last generation detailing the process
failures that have led to what Professor William Stuutz famously termed
I See Gene Healy, introduction to Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF AL
MOST EVERYTHING, at vii (Gene Healy ed., 2004) [hereinafter Co DIRECTLY TO JAIL];
J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Micit. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001);
Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, CATO POLICY REPORT (Cato Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Nov./Dec. 2003, at 1, 15, reprinted in Go DIRECTLY To km, supra, at 1-4.
2 See Healy, supra note 1, at 2; Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Corr, 39 TULSA L. REV.
755, 768-69 (2004); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 512-19; Luna, supra note 1, at 11.
3 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 519-22 (explaining the effective power of adjudication
that prosecutors receive because of the criminal code's breadth and depth); id. at 540-42
(describing the role of appellate judges in shaping the criminal law in ways favorable to
defendants); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal] (describing the proceduial
protections accompanying criminal adjudications).
4 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 522 (describing the effect of overcriminalization on the
law's expressive function); Luna, supra note 1, at 16 (noting the effect of overcriminaliza-
tion on the moral force of the penal code).
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the "pathological politics of criminal law."5 In many respects they are
right because the politics of the criminal law are deeply flawed. 6 Al-
though the flaws may not be fatal, they are very real, and they lead to a
widely held perception that the criminal law is broken and needs fix-
ing.7 So why is the criminal law such a mess? Many of these problems
and concerns share a common source: the intransigence of criminal
law.8 Once on the books, criminal law is difficult to repeal. 9 It stays with
us, despite changing moral convictions and majority preferences." The
intransigence, in turn, pressures other parts of the system." •
This Article examines one source of this intransigence: the Consti-
tution's failure to optimally account for change over time in social atti-
tudes regarding crime." Because of the flawed politics that the critics
have described, it is incredibly hard for politicians to change criminal
law to match changing social mores."
This Article explores the intransigence problem in greater depth
through an examination of the following claims. Our essentially con-
servative Constitution, with all of its checks and balances, systemati-
cally introduces a time lag into the criminal law that has widespread
detrimental effects." The Constitution requires a check-proof major-
ity to go from the absence of a law to the presence of a law, but it also
requires that same check-proof majority to go from the presence of a
law to the absence of one." In many cases, the time lag between the
end of a majority on one side of the decision to criminalize conduct
5 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 505.
6 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY 132-33 (2001) (criticizing the politics of criminal law because legisla-
tures enact punitive measures regardless of evidence supporting contrary policies and
engage in impulsive action without understanding the underlying problems). See generally
Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Polities of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. lbw. 541 (2005).
7 See, e.g., Husak, supra note 2, at 756; Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword to Ouercriminalization:
The Polities of Crime, supra note 6, at 541-43; Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2005).
8 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overaiminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags
to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 747, 773-75 (2005); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 509;
Luna, supra note 1, at 16.
g See Beale, supra note 8, at 773; Luna, supra note 1, at 16.
1° See Beale, supra note 8, at 773; Luna, supra note 1, at 16.
11 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 510.
12 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74 (analyzing why outdated moral statutes remain on
the books).
12 See Stunts, supra note 1, at 508 ("American criminal law's historical development has
borne no relation to any plausible normative theory.").
14 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
15 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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and the rise of a new check-proof majority on the other is unaccepta-
bly long; in some cases, it is potentially infinite." This Article argues
further that the lag is a component of many perceived problems in
the criminal law, often in non-obvious ways. The obvious problems
arise in the legislative process failures associated with checks and bal-
ances that apply to any law.° But there are others. For example, the
lag has led to the increased development of multiple doctrines that
seek to ameliorate the problem." Expanded judicial review, wide-
spread and largely unregulated prosecutorial discretion, and jury nul-
lification are routes for the other branches or the people to try to in-
tercede to correct for the time lag." But these all come with costs to
the perceived legitimacy of the law." As a result, at any given time,
significant portions of the criminal code are out of touch with major-
ity sentiment. 21 And taken together, these ameliorative doctrines in-
troduce so much noise into the system that they undercut other im-
portant goals of the criminal law, such as the transmission of rules and
the inculcation of values. 22 There would be less need for apparently
"countermajoritarian" and noise-inducing solutions if the law more
closely tracked majority values."
Is this time-lag problem endemic to democracy? Must it be this
way? The answer to both questions is a qualified "no." Two changes to
the Constitution, in a single amendment, could address much of the
time-lag problem. Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson proposed
to James Madison a sunset requirement on all law, and even the Consti-
tution itself, because Jefferson foresaw that. social conunitments could
undergo drastic change over time. 24 He believed that the Constitution
that Madison was then drafting would erect significant barriers to legis-
lative action that would make it likely for gulfs to open between popu-
La See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
17 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 510 (calling this dynamic 'surface politics").
15 See 15A AM. Jun. 2n Common Law § 2 (2000); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification
Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2007); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion and Its Limits, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 643, 646 n.19 (2002).
19 See 15A AM. Jut. 213 Common Law § 2; Brown, supra note 18, at 1155; Krug, supra
note 18, at 646 n.19.
20 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMU-
NITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 5-7 (1995).
21 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
22 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 522.
23 See id.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
of JAMES MADISON 382, 385 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., Univ. Press of Va. 1979).
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lar sentiment and enacted law." Jefferson's vision has come to pass,
particularly in the criminal law 26
Ultimately, this Article intends to suggest that there is a common
component to many of the problems of the criminal law that may not
be immediately apparent, and to suggest that reexamining some of the
existing critiques in light of a greater appreciation of the time-lag prob-
lem may provide a new access point for thinking about them. At the
end of this Article, I offer a proposed Criminal Sunset Amendment. 27
Even for those who reject out-of-hand law professor suggestions that we
amend the Constitution, the proposed amendment works as a thought
experiment, allowing the reader to reconsider the current system. I
consider the benefits and the costs of the proposed amendment, in
hopes of throwing current compromises into sharper relief. 28
This Article examines the time-lag problem of the criminal law in
five Parts. Part I examines the political failures that make repeal an in-
efficient solution to the time lag produced by changing moral corn-
mitments. 29 Part II examines the special concerns that arise in the
criminal law as a result of the limitations of repeal." Part III considers
the problems that have evolved in the absence of a fully functional
mechanism to account for changing commitments and in the absence
of other mechanisms for limiting the law's duration. 31 Part IV examines
the issue of sunset provisions from several angles. 32 It considers the
Framers' thoughts on time-based change in the law, including their
thoughts on sunsets. 33 It examines emerging scholarship on sunsets." It
then describes a proposed Criminal Sunset Amendment in detail."
Part V considers objections to the Amendment and current doctrine's
ability to address changing values over time. 36
25 See id.
26 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773; Stunts, supra note 1, at 508.
27 See infra notes 280-285 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 286-383 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 37-86 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 87-150 and accompanying text.
1 ' See infra notes 151-241 and accompanying text.
32 See info notes 242-328 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 246-263 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 264-275 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 277-328 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 329-383 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LIMITATIONS OF REPEAL
Attitudes toward behavior change over time. Groups that were
once subjugated are now free. 37
 Behavior that was once considered
subversive, obscene, or irreligious is now commonplace." Majorities
strong enough to overcome the checks and balances that slow legisla-
tion and enact a law at one point in time may pass away, but the same
obstructive genius intended to defend liberty stymies attempts by a new
majority to restore liberty." These limitations are inherent in the U.S.
Constitution's republican system, in part because the system takes for
granted that laws passed by one generation will continue in place until
repealed by another.0
But this need not be so. In a 1789 letter to James Madison propos-
ing that all laws—and the Constitution itself—should sunset every nine-
teen years, Thomas Jefferson warned that the power of repeal is not the
equivalent of the power to pass a law in the first instance.41 He cau-
tioned:
It may be said that the succeeding generation exercising in
fact the power of repeal, this leaves them as free as if the con-
stitution or law had been expressly limited to 19 years
only. . . . But the power of repeal is not an equivalent. It
might be indeed if every form of government were so per-
37 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3 (2004). Klarman argues that a variety of social
and political factors transformed the racial status quo that once oppressed blacks. Id. at 4.
38 See Beale, supra note 8, at 750-51. Beale surveys state Blue Laws, which regulate be-
havior on Sundays, and other state laws that prohibit swearing, spitting, and other now
commonplace behavior. See id. at 750-51 & nn.5-7.
39 See Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARM. L. REV. 80, 122 (1991) ("Checks and balances . . . im-
pede the repeal of old laws, including those that have over time come to violate entitle-
ments that philosopher judges deem fundamental; and this survival of old laws is a particu-
larly important, if frequently unnoticed, form of hiding.").
4° See generally Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Ruk Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970). Bernstein summarizes:
We take for granted that statutes once enacted continue in force until a later
legislature takes affirmative action by a fresh majority to repeal or amend.
Few statutes other than appropriation measures are enacted for limited peri-
ods; practically none expires with the legislature that enacted it despite the
sometimes tenuous majority that enacted it. Although that majority no longer
commands voter support, its law continues in force until a new coalition can
be mustered to enact a new statute.
Id. at 574 n.10.
41
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
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fectly contrived that the will of the majority could always be
obtained fairly and without impediment. But this is true of no
form. The people cannot assemble themselves. Their repre-
sentation is unequal and vicious. Various checks are opposed
to every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the
public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests
lead them astray from the general interests of their constitu-
ents: and other impediments arise so as to prove to every
practical man that a law of limited duration is much more
manageable than one which needs a repeal. 42
Practice has proved Jefferson prescient. The Framers' obstruction-
ist system of checks and balances is libertarian if laws are being written
on a blank slate, but not once the laws are on the books." The system of
checks and balances is very conservative, as it preserves the prior state."
It requires more than a majority to go from the absence of law to the
presence of law, but it also requires more than a majority to go from the
presence of law to the absence of law 45 A moral proposition that once
commanded a majority and made a particular behavior worthy of the
criminal sanction may remain criminal law long after that majority has
dissipated, until a supermajority on the other side develops."
The limitations of repeal are particularly acute in the criminal law,
where it may be particularly difficult to regularly change the laws to fit
changing moral conceptions. 47 The law should expand and contract as
social mores change, but as Professor Stuntz has noted, "The more ac-
curate generalization is that criminal law expands in different areas at •
42
 Id. at 385-86.
43 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
44 See id.
4 ' See Calabresi, supra note 39, at 122 n.36 ("Although unwanted, unworkable, and in-
capable of reenactment[, the anti-contraception statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965)] was politically hard to repeal. It was easier for legislators to use
checks and balances to duck the issue than to vote one way or the other on it."). Stuntz
disagrees that criminal laws require a majority of popular support, as the significant bene-
fits to legislators for passing nearly any criminal legislation, even when supported by only a
minority of voters, outweighs the diffuse costs that are, in most cases, simply passed on to
the enforcers. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 528.
46 See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1710-11 (2001)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court engages in democracy-forcing interventions in cases
where it must "make sure that the then-sitting legislature was being 'responsive to the peo-
ple,' rather than to the clamoring of a narrow interest group well positioned to block legis-
lative reform").
47 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
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different times and places, but it always expands." 48 Stuntz argues that
this constant expansion is clear evidence of the pathology of criminal
law.49
 Stuntz's position is widely held, 5° though not universal." Profes-
sor Darryl Brown's research indicates that legislatures "routinely de-
cline to enact proposals that fit the stereotype of politically irresistible
proposals for expanded liability and harsher sentences," 52 and "have
long and continuing records of repealing or narrowing criminal stat-
utes, reducing offense severity, and converting low-level crimes to civil
in frac tion s. "53
But Professor Brown, like Stuntz's other critics, must fall back on
desuetude and non-enforcement through prosecutorial discretion to
bolster their arguments that the politics of the criminal law are not as
pathological as most commentators insist." Moreover, it is still prob-
lematic if the politics of criminal law closely reflect ordinary politics. 55
Criminal law ought to be different from ordinary law because it pun-
ishes, often very severely, based on what should be broadly held moral
commitments.56
 Given the stakes, the politics of criminal law should be
better, not worse, than ordinary politics. 57 For those who are convinced
that Professor Brown has it right—or mostly right—I would agree. This
48 Stunts, supra note 1, at 527-28.
4° Sec id.
6° See DAvin A. J. RIGI1ARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND TIIE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN
Rinsrrs AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 271-72 (1982); Donald A. Dripps, Overeriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Pbssible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155, 1157 n.10
(2005); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tcar the Tag Off a Mattress: Ovarriminalization and
the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1536 (1997); Husak, supra note
2, at 769; Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, I Onto ST. J. GRIM, L. 261, 267-68
(2003); V.F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV.
925, 926 n.4 (2004); Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 638; James A. Strazzella et al., The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. GRIM. JUST. SEC. 7-11; Luna, supra note 1, at 4;
John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation 9 (Fed. Soc'y for
Law & Pub. Pol'y Paper, Oct. 1, 2004), available at hup://www.fed-soc.org/publications/
pubID.940/pub_detaiLasp; Paul Rosenzweig, The Overcrintinalization of Social and Economic
Conduct 3, 18 (The Heritage Found., Legal Memorandum No. 7, Apr. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/upload/40268_1.pdf . See generally Overcrimi-
utilization: The Politics of Crime supra note 6.
51 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 248 (2007).
52 Id.
55
 Id. at 225.
54 See id. ("Further, when legislatures leave out-dated crimes on the books, other com-
ponents of democratic governance compensate: politically accountable prosecutors rarely
prosecute (and thus effectively nullify) many crimes the public cares little about—and that
scholarship complains about.").
55 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 644-45.
56 See RicnAtins, supra note 50, at 277.
57 See GARLAND, supra note 6, at 132-33.
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might suggest that my proposal is unnecessary. My proposal, however, is
more nuanced. In my view, the problem is not that the criminal law
never changes; instead, the problem is that the criminal law, at any
given time, is sufficiently out of phase with public opinion such that a
significant perception exists that the law does not reflect community
values. 58 This perception is the underlying basis that results in the wide-
spread sentiments expressed by Professor Stuntz and those like him. 59
Therefore, it is entirely possible for Professor Brown to be correct in his
assertion that the politics of the criminal law are surprisingly ordinary,
while the arguments contained in this article also remain correct: ordi-
nary politics are insufficient to maintain widespread public faith that
the criminal law accurately represents current public sentiment.°
To understand the reasons why repeal is an inadequate mecha-
nism for synchronizing public attitudes toward crime with the law on
the books, it is necessary to understand first a little about the interrela-
tionship between the expressive functions of the criminal law and the
efforts required to repeal a criminal stattute. 61 To say that the criminal
58 See Beak, supra note 8, at 773-74; see also ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 20, at 50
(conducting empirical studies to compare community views and criminal codes).
59 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 528.
6° See Brown, :ulna note 51, at 225.
61 See Stunts, supra note 1, at 519 ("Broad codes cannot be enforced as written; thus,
the definition of the law-on-the-street necessarily differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-
on-the-books. Expressive theories of criminal law have not yet taken good account of this
problem, and the problem is severe, maybe devastating."). For discussions of the expressive
function of the law, see ROBERT C. ELLICRSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 254-56 (1991); Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Crimi-
nal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv.
197, 221-22 (1965); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
947, 949, 953, 979 (1997); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DORE L.J. 1, 22, 24, 37; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L.
REV, 389, 414; Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 47 (1989); Michael Harper,
Comment on the Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REv. 23, 26 (1996);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407
(1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. Ctn. L. REV. 423, 435-40 (1963); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351, 362, 365 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deter-
rence's Difficulty, 95 Mtcn. L. REv. 2385, 2445-48 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. Ctn. L. REV. 943, 997 (1995); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:
The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YAS.E L.J. 1795, 1863 (1992); Richard
H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. Rev. 625, 634; Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Micti. L. REV. 338, 397-400
(1997); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. ECON.
'519, 540 (1996); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
857, 910 (1994); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
1336	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1327
law has an expressive function as well as an instrumental function is to
recognize that we make a statement about our collective values when
we choose to criminalize certain behaviors. 62 According to this view,
when the legislature has determined that a particular behavior merits
being treated as criminal, it is stating that the behavior is immoral."
The people who commit crimes are criminals, and they are no longer
worthy of full participation in the social order." Federal law prohibits
all felons from possessing firearms." Felons are barred from receiving
many federal and state benefits. 66 In many states, they are stripped
permanently of the right to vote and are in effect exiled from the
course of ordinary politics.67 Labeling something a crime expresses an
important social consensus about the reprehensibility of the behavior."
There is a significant risk of generational lag in this area, as laws remain
on the books but fall further and further out of touch with the senti-
ments of a majority. 69
B.U. L. REV. 201, 206-09 (1996) [hereinafter Robinson, Utility of Desert]; Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 457, 471-72, 474 (1997); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM, L. REV. 903, 907 (1996); Symposium,
The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000).
62 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, Supra note 20, at 202; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the
Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86
VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2000); Robinson, Utility of Desert, supra note 61, at 471.
63 See Christopher Bennett, State Denunciation of Crime, 3 J. OF MORAL PHIL. 288, 298
(2006); Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship
Between the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and the Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF.
CRDA. L. REV. 149, 159 (2001); Hamish Stewart, Harms, Wrongs, and Set-Backs in Feinberg's
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 5 BUFF. Clint. L. Rev. 47, 66 (2001). This view is not universal
because some view crime definition as simply another method of social ordering devoid of
moral content. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of the Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363, 1369-70 (2000). For people with this view, the choice of the criminal sanc-
tion is more about the selection of optimal methods of enforcement. See id.
" See Bennett, supra note 63, at 290-91.
65
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
66 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL. DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 1 (1996) (summarizing state disenfranchisement laws and laws
governing other civil disabilities).
67 Ten states ban felons from voting for life, and five more ban them for some period
of time after they have completed their sentence. Id. at app. Forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia prohibit inmates from voting while incarcerated for a felony offense. Id.
Thirty-five states prohibit felons from voting while they are on parole, and thirty of those
also exclude felony probationers. Id.
68 See Bennett, supra note 63, at 290-91.
69 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74. Professor Brown has done an excellent job of
demonstrating that, once there is a new supermajority, the criminal law does change. See
Brown, supra note 51, at 234-35 (discussing, inter alia, the repeal of alcohol prohibition,
miscegenation statutes, and an ticontraception statutes).
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The expressive function of the law can exacerbate the lag between
values and the law because the political statement made by the passage
of a criminal law and the statement made by the repeal of the same law
are not equivalent." As a result, the political costs of such votes are sig-
nificantly different as wel1.7 ' Consider the dynamic at work in a particu-
lar case where public perception toward a type of behavior has changed
over time: in the initial state, when no law has passed, the behavior in
question may be considered deplorable—because it is dangerous, fool-
ish, or immoral—but not considered criminal. Then a law is passed
making the statement that the particular behavior is deplorable, illegal,
and probably immoral. Over time, some people will believe that that
behavior, while still deplorable or immoral, need not be criminal. Oth-
ers will believe that the behavior is no longer deplorable or immoral,
and should not be criminal. Some may even believe the behavior is af-
firmatively good.
The political danger lies in the difficulty in calibrating a vote along
this spectrum of varying beliefs in an era of sound-bite politics where
criminal statutes become campaign material." Voting to overturn a law
has the potential to be seen as condoning the behavior, and even politi-
cians who take pains to explain a different basis for their decision run
the risk that their opponents will assert that they condone the behav-
ior. 73 Once a behavior has been criminalized, public sentiment must
undergo a dramatic change in favor of the behavior to decriminalize
it. 74 Decriminalization is inherently difficult because it requires a posi-
tive act: stopping law enforcement officials from interfering with behav-
ior that a legislator might. fmd foolish, costly, or detrimental to the pub-
lic good, but that he might still reasonably believe should not be
criminal."
An example of this dynamic at work can be seen in efforts to re-
peal controlled substances laws." Imagine the universe of politicians
7° See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
71 See id.
7° See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 644-45.
73 See id.
74 See id.
7° See id.
76 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-486 (1996); WILLIAM J. BENNETE ET AL., BODY COUNT:
MORAL POVERTY . . AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 137-
90 (1996); DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POL-
ICY 38 (2005); DOUGLAS HUSAR, LEGALIZE THIS!: THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS
125-78 (2002); Philip B. Heymann, Introduction: Drug Policy with a New Focus, in DRUG AD-
DICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 1, 11 (Philip B.
Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001).
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who wish to decriminalize controlled substances. Some subset of the
proponents of decriminalization, Group A, the consequentialists, may
believe that drug use is stupid, dangerous, and deplorable. They may
simultaneously believe that it should not be criminal for instrumental
reasons—prohibition effects lead to massively skewed markets, and ad-
diction leads to inflexible demand with artificially inflated prices, creat-
ing massive spillover effects such as violent crime and property crime
resulting from the artificially inflated prices. Group B, the health-care
modelers, may believe that criminalizing addiction is not a statement of
their moral position. Some politicians will belong to both groups. But
opposing politicians are able to treat votes from Groups A and B as in-
distinguishable from the votes of Group C, the libertines, who believe
that drug use is good, moral, and should be condoned. Politicians who
would naturally fall into Group A may be unwilling to vote for decrimi-
nalization because, although in the absence of the law they would never
vote for it, in its presence they believe that a vote for repeal is tanta-
mount to condoning the behavior. Similar analyses could apply to abor-
tion, gambling, prostitution, assisted suicide, or multiple other behav-
iors."
Given the political and practical barriers to reducing the criminal
law by repeal, it would be difficult for the criminal law to carefully track
the moral position of a current majority of the population. 78 Sex, drugs,
and pornography; alcohol, tobacco, and firearms; murder, rape, and
robbery—each of these things is the province of criminal law, and ap-
plying the criminal law to each is controversial in some instances. For
each of these things there has been significant generational change in
attitudes, sometimes in favor of harsher punishment, sometimes in fa-
vor of greater freedom. And there are significant regional differences
in views toward each, especially at the margins. Changes over time can
result in different laws reflecting those different attitudes existing si-
multaneously on the books."
Even murder statutes are rife with shifting value judgments, such
as the beginning and ending of life, the status of the fetus, the criminal-
ity of assisted suicide, the basis for reduction of murder to manslaugh-
ter, and defenses based on various medical and psychological ail-
77 See generally RICHARDS, supra note 50 (exploring the legal landscape of such topics to
criticize overcriminalization from an antiutilitarian perspective of human rights).
78 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
79 See id. But see Stuntz, supra note 1, at 512 (arguing that the scope of core crimes, like
murder, have not broadened significantly since the days of Blackstone).
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ments. 80 Thus, statutes addressing issues with almost universal agree-
ment about the core crime, like murder, could benefit from the peri-
odic reexamination of the value judgments at the margins. 81
When the law becomes incoherent, or when the public senses
that the law is out of touch with the times, it undermines the criminal
law's moral authority.82 This moral authority is not just philosophically
good, it is also instrumentally good because it can then be more effec-
tive at the margins, even in those cases not clearly condemnable, if it
is seen as generally respectful of where the margins in fact Lie, The
limitations of repeal make it inherently difficult for the criminal law
to accurately track the changes at the margins. 84
Ordinary politics exacerbates the problems created by the limita-
tions of repeal: they treat criminal laws no differently than other legisla-
tion, often incorporating them into omnibus legislation or using them
as candidates for logrolling. 85 Permitting the legislature to create
crimes through votes on broader legislative packages further muddies
the clear moral message that should be sent by the criminal law. 86
II. OVERCRIMINALIZATION
The limitations of repeal inevitably lead to perceived overcriminali-
zation.87 Numerous commentators on the criminal law have pointed out
that the criminal law expands almost continually, and that it is incredibly
difficult to repeal a criminal law once it is on the books. 88 There is like-
wise broad agreement within the academy that too much criminal law
has resulted. 89 The solutions that the commentators propose in re-
a° But see Stunts, supra note 1, at 512.
81 But see id.
82 See id. at 520.
a' Paul H. Robinson, Testing Lay Intuitions of Justice, How and Why, 28 HorsTRA L. REV.
611, 612 (1999) (If [the criminal law] earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what
the community, given sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive as con-
demnable, people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as
an appropriate guide in those borderline cases . . .").
84 See Beak, supra note 8, at 773-74.
88 The American Bar Association's Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law criti-
cizes the federalization of criminal law through the standard legislative mechanisms.
Strazella, supra note 50, at 53. The Task Force also suggests that Congress should imple-
ment institutional mechanisms to ensure a more coherent analysis of perceived crime
problems, given the often piecemeal nature of federal crime legislation at present. Id.
06 Se_eStuntz, supra note 1, at 522.
87 See Beak, supra note 8, at 773-74.
88 See, e.g., Stunts, supra note 1, at 527-28. See generally Overcriminalization: The Politics of
Crime, supra note 6.
89 See generally OvercriminalizatWn: The Politics of Crime, supra note 6.
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sponse to this overcriminalization vary widely, depending on their view
of the appropriate purposes of the criminal law and their philosophical
positions on the appropriate limiting principles. 90 Nevertheless, retribu-
tivists, utilitarians, and legal realists unite in decrying the scope and the
range of the criminal law.91
There are at least three strands to the overcriminalization argu-
ment." The first considers the criminal law's breadth: too much con-
duct is prohibited." The laws on the books either do not reflect soci-
ety's moral consensus regarding the behavior that deserves the criminal
sanction or they defy some limiting principle." A second considers the
criminal law's depth: there are too many overlapping laws, even if they
apply to conduct we actually want to prohibit. 95 In combination, this
excess makes it incredibly difficult to determine what the law actually is,
and it opens the way for manipulation and abuse as these provisions are
selected and applied.% A cluttered criminal code fails to teach the pub-
lic what values society has chosen. 97 The third major overcriminaliza-
tion criticism—that the laws are excessively punitive—is beyond the
scope of this Article."
A. Breadth
A principal concern for the commentators is breadth; the laws
cover too much conduct.99 Overbreadth in the criminal law brings mul-
tiple costs, including overdeterring desirable behavior because conduct
that society no longer condemns remains subject to the risk of criminal
as See id.
91 See id.
82 See infra notes 99-150 and accompanying text.
See Stun tz, supra note 1, at 512-19.
" Sc, e.g., HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-363 (1968);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful' Mean "Criminall: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B,U. L. REV. 193,193-94 (1991); Hart, supra note 61, at 407;
Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overeriminalization, 374 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
157,160 (1967); Kadish, supra note 61,435-40.
'15 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 518-19.
" See id. at 519-23.
sr See id. at 522.
98 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 8-9. To the extent that critics believe that the
criminal law is too punitive because public sentiment is too punitive, a proposal that more
properly aligns the law on the books and public conceptions of morality may actually be
viewed as counterproductive. See id.
See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 514-18.
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sanction."' Incomprehensibility compounds the problems that depth
creates, making law abiding citizens into inadvertent criminals."'
Dead-letter laws raise additional concerns. 102 They are the thicket
of laws that remain on the books long after the circumstances that
brought them into being." 5 Desuetude and unconstitutional statutes
still on the books confound the promulgation and transmission func-
tions of the law. 1 " The law cannot educate the public about core so-
cial values if it imparts conflicting views. 105 If ordinary citizens cannot
read the criminal code and decipher for themselves the scope of the
behavior that is covered, then the code is failing in one of its critical
functions.'" If the readers of the criminal code have to resort to case
law and administrative letters of interpretation to determine whether
or not they are engaging in criminal behavior, the concept of notice
becomes a laughingstock."' If significant portions of the code are
desttetudinal, or partially enforced, or of questionable status, the code
can become affirmatively misleading.'°8
Imagine a particular person trying to decide if he can engage in
consensual sexual intercourse with someone who is not his spouse. He
reads the criminal code and finds in it bans on fornication and cohabi-
tation. He is assured that no one ever enforces those laws and that he
can ignore them. Additionally, someone suggests that the law might be
unconstitutional, although no court has so ruled. The choice these
people face, as do many others similarly situated, is no longer between
obeying and disobeying the law (essentially a binary choice), but be-
tween breaking some laws and not others along a continuum. 109 The
100 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
101 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 522. Professor Stuntz notes that these criticisms are be-
coming dated as scholars and society have widened the concept of harm beyond the classic
positions that date back to John Stuart Mill. See id. at 507 & n.2 (citing Bernard E. Har-
court, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999)).
102 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
105 For a discussion of odd and antiquated statutes that remain on the books, see Luna,
supra note 1, at 1,15 and Beale, supra note 8, at 750-51.
104 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 521 (noting that broad criminal codes ensure sending'
inconsistent messages to the public because they are not enforced as written).
195 See id.
105 See id.
107
	 id.
1°8 See id.
109 For a version of this argument based on general concerns regarding regulatory
overcriminalization, see James V. DeLong, The New "Criminal" Classes: Legal Sanctions and
Business Managers, in Go Diat:cirtm TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 906-37. Belong writes:
Overuse of punitive sanctions damages the moral fabric of the culture. . . .
[W]hen people who regard themselves as responsible moral actors learn that
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choice, then, is not whether to be law abiding but where to draw the
line along the lawbreaking continuum. One could have a meaningful
debate in a room full of law professors, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges about what precisely constitutes the current state of the
criminal law as applied to many different classes of conduct. To expect
the ordinary citizen to choose for herself, at her peril, which of the laws
on the books to obey because they may or may not be enforceable, is
fundamentally unfair."° In addition, such breadth threatens the moral
force that criminal law carries.'"
Revival is a special situation of criminal law that aggravates the
overbreadth problem." 2 It arises when a statute remains on the books
after a court declares it to be unconstitutional." 3 The statute then lies
dormant and unenforced.'" Constitutional politics change, however,
and a statute long-unenforced can come back to life after decades. 115
The obvious examples are the myriad antiabortion and anti-contra-
ception statutes that linger on the books after Roe v. Wade,n 6 its succes-
sors, and Griswold v. Conneetieut. 117 After Lamella v. Texas, anti-sodomy,
they have committed criminal offenses that they have never even heard of,
their first reaction is disbelief. Their second is contempt for the law. The de-
veloping perception is that one cannot possibly keep up with all the rules and
cannot afford to try. The rational person must shrug and accept the possibil-
ity of criminal conviction as one of the risks of life . . . .
Id. Other scholars have suggested that the moral authority of the law is a more important
component than the risk of punishment in ensuring compliance. See ROBINSON Sc Dikat.ev,
supra note 20, at 5-7, 201-15; TOM R. TitER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE Lim 19-68 (1990).
uo See DeLong, supra note 109, at 36-.37.
111 Luna, supra note 1, at 7. Professor Luna explains:
[O]vercriminalization weakens the moral force of the criminal law. . . .
When the criminal sanction is used for conduct that is widely viewed as harm-
less or undeserving of the severest condemnation, the moral force of the pe-
nal code is diminished, possibly to the point of near irrelevance among some
individuals and groups.
Id.
115 William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Un-
constitutional" Statutes, 93 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1902, 1903 (1993).
115 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
115 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a constitutional right
to privacy protects a woman's decision to have an abortion prior to the fetus's viability. Id.
117 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that a constitutional
right to privacy protects a married couple's right to contraception. Id.
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adultery, and cohabitation statutes are receiving similar scrutirty. 118 The
Court's pronouncements, however, are not permanent. 119 Stare decisis
and discussion of "super-precedents" notwithstanding, the Court's foray
into very political areas has led to an increasingly politicized process of
choosing who sits on the Court. 12° Areas that some justices believed
they took off the political table will come back into play. And they may
be coming back into play with statutes—passed long ago and unen-
forced for generations—awaiting the enforcers. 121 Some scholars have
suggested that the courts develop a doctrine that forbids revival. 122 Al-
though the liberty principle has much to recommend it, this Article
demonstrates that the structural bias in our constitutional system is ac-
tually conservative, not libertarian.'" If there is no law in place, the bias
is in favor of keeping it off the book.s. 124 Once there is a law in place,
however, the bias is in favor of keeping it on the books. 125
B. Depth
The second concern about the scope of the criminal law is
depth—too many laws cover the same concluct. 126 Too much depth in
the criminal law makes it incomprehensible. 127 There is no question
that the number of crimes on the books has exploded, with more than
116 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that a constitutional
right to privacy protects a homosexual couple's right to engage in consensual sexual activ-
ity in the privacy of the home. Id.
119 See id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick because it "was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today").
1 m See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 HARV, J.L.
& Pun. POLY 875, 884 (2008) ("One of the chief flaws of Justice Brennan-style non-
originalism is that it takes hotly contested issues like abortion out of the democratic proc-
ess in the fifty states, where compromise is possible, and puts them under the power of the
Supreme Court, which cannot produce compromise solutions. The constitutionalization
and nationalization of the abortion dispute in Roe v. Wade has embittered the confirmation
process for all federal judges and has roiled our politics for more than three decades."). See
generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUS-110ES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
121 See Calabresi, supra note 120, at 884.
222 See Treanor & Sperling, supra note 112, at 1906 ("[G]iven the essentially libertarian
bias of our constitutional system of governance, a statute that has once been unconstitu-
tional under governing case law should not be revived if it constrains individual liberty
123 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
124 See id.
1 " See id.
128 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 518.
127 See id. at 522.
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three thousand federal crimes now listed. 128 A truly accurate count is
almost impossible because other statutes criminalize violations of addi-
tional thousands of administrative regulations. 129 An increasingly mo-
bile society compounds the problem because citizens are constructively
responsible for knowing the state criminal code and the common law
crimes in every jurisdiction they enter.'" The law undermines its own
legitimacy, and, perversely, its own ability to alter behavior through law
abidingness, when it becomes so complex as to be unknowable."'
Excessive depth can also lead to perceived illegitimacy for an-
other reason—it permits selective prosecution" 2 and differential prose-
cution. 133 A prosecutor can select charges with higher penalties for
disfavored defendants, stack charges against defendants so long as
there is a different element in each crime, and dismiss charges for
some defendants and not others via plea deals. 134
1211 Baker, supra note 50, at 3; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 (1995).
129 Baker, supra note 50, at 8.
t!0 We expect people to know and follow the law. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse" is
a basic maxim of criminal law, familiar to both lawyers and layman. See The Commercen,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 386 (1816).
"'At any given time, with regard to a particular behavior, we expect people to be able
to sort through the following possibilities and act accordingly: There is a rule. There was a
rule. There is a rule, but it is unenforceable. There is a rule, but it might be unenforce-
able. There is a rule, but it is unenforced. There is a rule, but I can't understand it. There
is a rule, but it is unfair. There might be a rule, but I can't fmd it. There is a rule, but it is
only enforced against certain classes of people. The rules don't apply to me because . . . .
There are conflicting rules. Some rules have safe harbors, and this behavior does or does
not fit. There is a general rule and a specific rule, and they seem to conflict, so I choose
this one because . . . . There are multiple rules, with different people charged with en-
forcing them, and they give conflicting advice, so I will choose this action because . . . .
132 Krug, supra note 18, at 645. Selective prosecution occurs when prosecutors choose
to enforce the laws against specific classes of people. Id. Although there are many exam-
ples of benefits of choosing certain classes of defendants based on the nature of their
crimes, the power to select brings with it the risk that defendants will be selected for in-
vidious reasons, such as race or politics. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Inde-
pendence, Power; and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IowA L. REV. 393, 408, 410 n.66 (2001).
133 Krug, supra note 18, at 645. Differential prosecution discriminates between defen-
dants by punishing some who commit a specific type of conduct under one statute, with a
specific penalty scheme, and other defendants under a different statute, with very differ-
ent penalties. Id.
*4 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 132, at 408, 438; Krug, supra note 18, at 650-52; Note, Fed-
eral Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080,
2088 (2000). One response to the problem has been real offense sentencing, which em-
powers judges to address the potential abuses at sentencing. Michael L. Seigel & Christo-
pher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1119-21 (2005).
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C. Unintended Consequences
The limitations of repeal also exacerbate the ill effects of the
law's unintended consequences. 185 It is impossible to know in advance
the real-world results of a criminal law. 138 This might result in what
Professor Stuntz has termed self-defeating criminal laws.'" Stuntz ar-
gues that the passage of a criminal law in some instances reveals the
social costs and benefits of the prohibited behavior, and in others re-
veals the social costs of the sentiment that led to the crime's crea- '
tion."8 Where the law reveals the price to be too high, the proponents
of the law have sown the seeds to destroy the value they were trying to
enshrine.'" For example, he shows that the Prohibition laws were de- .
signed to enforce a new norm against drinking, but their enforce-
ment caused a backlash against the system."° Once it became a matter
for legal enforcement, society realized that it was a cost it was not will-
ing to bear and overturned Prohibition."'
The law of unintended consequences can also result in exces-
sively costly, but not self-defeating laws. 142 Laws that would not have
passed given the full price in unintended or unforeseen consequences
might remain on the books, even though a majority of the population
and the current legislature would not now vote for it. 143
Assume that, at time A, prior to the passage of the law, there are
three groups of legislators. Group X, the absolutists, wants the criminal
law at any cost. Group X is not large enough to assure passage of the
law. Group Y, the relativists, wants the law at some prices, but not at
others. Group Z, the libertarians, opposes the law. If at time A the ap-
parent cost of the law is within the range that Group Y is willing to pay,
the measure will pass, and the behavior will become a crime. Imagine
that at a later time, B, the cost of the measure has been shown to ex-
ceed the price that Group Y legislators were willing to pay. At the re-
vealed price, the law is not worth it to them and they would transfer
their support to Group Z. The essentially conservative system of separa-
135 See generally Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social
Action, 1 An. Soc. REV. 894 (1936) (exploring the reasons for unintended, though not
necessarily undesirable, effects of purposive social conduct).
me See id. at 898.
1 "Williarn .J. Stuntz, SelfDefeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871,1872 (2000).
"a Id. at 1896.
159 Id at 1874-75.
Ito Id.
141 Id. at 1874-80.
142 Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
145 See id.
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Lion of powers, however, which requires multiple parties to agree to a
substantive change, means that Group X likely can obstruct the repeal
of the law.'" This type of veto-gate disconnect further undermines the
moral authority of the criminal law.'"
This Article, then, falls somewhere in a middle ground between
Professors Stun tz and Brown." The generalization it proposes is nei-
ther that the criminal law always expands, nor that the politics of
criminal law differ little from ordinary politics. 147 Instead, it suggests
that the best generalization is that, at any given time, a significant por-
tion of the criminal law On the books does not comport with majority
sentiments because the limitations of repeal too often cause an unac-
ceptable time lag between changed public sentiments and the crimi-
nal law.'" In many cases, the time lag between new majority sentiment
and new criminal law is significant, and, in other cases, permanent."9
The lag creates the perception that the criminal law is out of touch, or
perhaps immora1. 150
III. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR COSTS
Current doctrine includes multiple partial solutions to the prob-
lem of changing attitudes toward crime and the failure of repeal to
adequately reflect thern. 19 ' Desuetude, judicial construction of statutes,
constitutionalization of the criminal law, prosecutorial discretion, and
jury nullification all operate in part to ameliorate the problems of
changing commitments.'" Each solution, however, comes at a cost that
144 Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV, 40, 62-63 (1961)
("(Gireater strength must be mobilized to repeal a statute than to resist its enactment.").
Bickel argues that it would be foolish and paralyzing for the legislature to reconsider the
statute book continually. Id. He believes the statute book will be examined and altered
when necessary because popular will rejects how the laws are enforced. Id. For further
discussion of his views, see infra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
148 See McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 LAW AND ECONOMICS HANDBOOK
1651,1685-86 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stephen Shave! eds., 2007). For a discussion of veto-
gates, see infra notes 302-316 and accompanying text.
148 See Brown, supra note 51, at 225; Stunts, supra note I, at 527-28.
147 See Brown, supra note 51, at 225; Stunts, supra note 1, at 527-28.
148 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
149 see id.
188 See Stunts, supra note 137, at 1872 ("In a legal system structured as ours is, crimi-
nalization can work against the very norms on which it rests, meaning that popular norms
may tend to move in the opposite direction from the law.").
181 See infra notes 154-241 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 154-241 and accompanying text.
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could be reduced by a structural mechanism that would make them less
necessary. 158 	Article considers each in turn.
A. Desuetude
One way that the law has attempted to come to grips with the
moral judgments of a dead generation is the legal concept of desue-
tude. 154 The doctrine of desuetude provides that obsolete statutes can-
not be invoked after a sufficiently lengthy period of disuse. 155
As Professor Alexander Bickel articulated in his article, The Passive
Virtues, the current widespread disobedience of a statute does not make
it destietudinal. 156 Instead, a longstanding government policy of non-
enforcement drives desuetude.'" When prosecutors have ignored the
existence of a law in the face of known widespread violation of that law,
the public is lulled into believing that the law will no longer be en-
forced.158 After some period, a law that has not been enforced can no
longer be enforced. 159
There are complications in deciding, first, how long a period of
non-enforcement is "too long" and, second, how much discretion
prosecutors should have in overlooking certain violations and enforcing
others. 15° The courts determine the length of that period and enforce
desuetude against the government."' This increases the relative power
of the courts and undermines the executive's capacity to exercise prose-
cutorial discretion. 162 Even a fairly robust enforcement of desuetude is
unlikely to lead to judicial overreaching, its proponents say, because the
instances of desuetudinal enforcement of statutes will be rare. 163 But
precisely because it is exceedingly rare, desuetude is not a particularly
153 See infra notes 154-241 and accompanying text.
154 See Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulernaking: Reconciling Principle and
Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62.81 (1976) ("`Desuetude' is the ancient doctrine that long
and continuous failure to enforce a statute, coupled wih [sic] open and widespread viola-
tion of it by the populace, is tantamount to repeal of the statute.").
155 See id.
I" See Bickel, supra note 144, at 62-63.
157 Id. at 63.
158 Id.
159 id.
180 Allen, supra note 154, at 83 (rejecting desuetude in part to restrict the power of the
executive to render a law ineffective through non-enforcement).
181 See Bickel, supra note 144, at 63.
182 Allen, supra note 154, at 82-83.
183 Cass R. Surts -rm, ONE CASE AT A TIME 111  (1999).
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useful doctrine. 1 " Desuetude also raises significant separation of powers
issues because the executive, through non-enforcement, and the judici-
ary, through a due-process-based refusal to enforce desuetudinal stat-
utes, are permitted to override the legislature.' 65
B. Judicial Construction
American law also deals with change over time through the constant
readjustments possible with judicial construction. 166 Adjusted moral
commitments are translated into different legal commitments in the
form of criminal law. 167 In a system where criminal law is developed
through the common law, there may be more room for this constant
process of renegotiation of rights, freedoms, and responsibilities.' 68
Judges can constantly reevaluate the balance of social forces and ad-
just the law accordingly. 169 The historical trend of the criminal law in
the United States, however, is away from common law and toward
statutory law, which is further refined by applying the principle of le-
gality and the rule of lenity.'" It is, for example, an oft-repeated
aphorism that there is "no federal common law of crimes." Given
the trend, the hardening of the law's outlines in the form of legisla-
164 Cass Sunstein, a proponent of desuetude, believes it would improve the judicial
minimalism that he has favored in his recent writing. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 96-99 (2005); see
also SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 109-10. Professor Allen takes a contrary view. See Allen,
supra note 154, at 81-82. He notes that, although the doctrine has roots dating back as far
as the Roman jurist Julian, the practice is exceedingly rare. Id. Moreover, Allen argues, the
courts and prosecutors violate separation of powers and legislative primacy when they rely
on the doctrine. Id. at 84. Allen rejects Bickel's view of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(discussed infra at notes 193-209 and accompanying text), arguing that desuetude has
been rejected by all of the states that had considered the issue squarely. Id. at 84 & n.101
("The potential for abuse emanating from long dormant statutes often seems to trouble
courts, but they usually find a way to dispose of the case without resort to desuetude.").
165 See Allen, supra note 154, at 82-83 ("The basis for [the) consistent rejection of des-
uetude by the courts is a respect for the doctrine of separation of powers.").
e6 Strong judicial construction can result effectively in desuetude because statutes can
be interpreted out of existence. Bickel, supra note 154, at 62.
I 137 See 15A AM. Jim. 2n Common Law § 2 (2000) ("The Common Law has an inherent
capacity for growth and change.").
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 30-33 (4th ed. 2006); PACKER,
supra note 94, at 79-102. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS or LEGALITY: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996); Dan M. Kahan, Sallie RealiSrlt AbOUt RetrOaCtiVe Cfintinal
Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 95 (1997); Paul H, Robinson, Legality and Discretion
in the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 HAttv. J. oN LEGIS. 393 (1988).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,34 (1812).
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Lion, which experiences change only marginally by judicial construc-
tion between periods of legislative attention, has made possible a sig-
nificant disconnect between the law on the books and the society's
current moral judgments. 172 In most instances, textual limitations
leave very little room for judicial construction to align them. 178
C. Constitutionalization
Much of the judicial branch's former common law power to regu-
late the definition of crimes has moved into the constitutional law
arena. 174 The courts, relying on various federal and state constitutional
provisions, declare laws unconstitutional because they violate explicit
constitutional text or "evolving standards" divined by the courts. 175 For
many legal commentators, the legislature's inability to align the criminal
law with contemporary values legitimized additional judicial oversight of
the substantive law.176 A ifsign want disconnect between the law and cur-
rent values leads to a pressure on the system that seeks relief in the judi-
ciary.'" The perceived legitimacy of the substantive statutes affects judi-
cial opinions in areas such as the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and substantive due process. 178
Some of the changes .the Court has made are now popular. It was
once a crime to argue for the overthrow of the government. 178 It was
02 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.
REv. 345.
175 Robinson, supra note 170, at 394 ("Prior and precise written rules make decisions
on liability more predictable and uniform than they would be if decisionmakers enjoyed
more discretion, but such rules also tend to leave decisionmakers less able to adapt solu-
tions to individual circumstances.").
174 See DRESSLER, supra note 170, at 35.
175 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.").
178 ,E e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (1962) (arguing, not specifically regarding criminal
law, that "courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legisla-
tures and executives do not possess"); cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005).
177 See BICKEL, supra note 176, at 25.
175 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (substantive due process); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (First Amend-
ment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Eighth Amendment); Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) {Fourth Amendment).
179 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969) (overturning Ohio law forbid-
ding "advocat[ing). . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political re-
form").
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once a crime for a black person to marry a white person. 18° It was once
a crime for a doctor to dispense contraceptives. 18' There are still laws -
on the books in many states that would ban these behaviors, but they
cannot be enforced because of cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio, 182 Loving
v. Virginia, 183 and Griswold v. Connecticut. 184 The constitutionalization of
crime should cause a one-way ratchet in favor of increased freedom be-
cause constitutional limitations privilege certain classes of behavior,
thereby taking classes of crimes away from the legislature and off the
books. 185 Perversely, this movement, engendered by legislative failure to
act where the Court thought support for a law had disappeared, has
made it more difficult for legislatures to account for changing social
attitudes towards crime. 186
The judicial invalidation of statutes creates what Professor Bickel
famously denominated the countermajoritarian difficulty.' 87 Dozens of
leading scholars, including John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet,
William Stuntz, and Akhil Amar have grappled with how much judicial
invalidation is proper, and under what conditions. 188 Each comes to his
or her own conclusion, but all admit that there is a cost to overturning
statutes that reflect the will of the people. 189
Stare decisis, precedential limits on lower courts, and limited judi-
cial resources combine to restrain the courts' ability to reverse course if
it appears they made a mistake. 19° Constitutionalizing the mistake takes
18° Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (overturning Virginia law barring interra-
cial marriage).
181 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
182 395 U.S. at 449.
183 388 U.S. at 12.
Is' 381 U.S. at 479,
188 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
toe Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
792 (2006) ("Constitutional law makes legislative regulation of constitutionalized subjects
politically costly. -). Stuns argues that the constitutionalization of criminal law has made it
more punitive and harsh because it provided incentives for legislators to expand criminal
codes and disincentives for them to regulate policing and trial procedures. Id. Similarly, here,
once the Court has asserted a position, the legislature has reduced incentive to bring the
criminal code in line with popular sentiments. Cf. id.
Iv See BICKEL, supra note 176, at 16.
188 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); SUNSTEIN, supra note 163; MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1999); Stuntz, supra note 186.
188 See generally ELY, supra note 188; SUNSTEIN, supra note 163; TUSHNET, supra note
188; Amar, supra note 188; Stuntz, supra note 186.
19° See BICKEL, supra note 176, at 30 (discussing the stability of the Court as an institu-
tion); SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 49 (discussing the error costs for wrong, wide rulings).
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the ability to readjust away from the legislature. 19 ' This cost is com-
pounded when courts are asked to show fidelity to generations-old con-
stitutional text, particularly when applied to unforeseen and unfore-
seeable circumstances. 192 Bickel noted that what he called "the passive
virtues" were a way that the justices could avoid the countermajori-
tarian difficulty by acting in a way that was democracy-forcing.'" The
passive virtues are tools with which the Court can avoid direct confron-
tation with the will of the legislature, acting instead to return the prob-
lem to the legislature for resolution.'" Professor Sunstein has updated
Bickel's work with his writing on minimalism, suggesting that the courts
should self-consciously leave room for the legislature to work. 195 If the
real problem is a perception that the law on the books is out of touch
with the prevailing views of society, then the Court's solution should be
to test that perception by forcing society to tell it so.I 96
How often does this democracy reinforcement happen, and
through what mechanism? Professor Bickel asserted, "It would be fool-
ish of course, and it would ensure paralysis, to expect continual expres-
sion of the legislative will through continual reconsideration of the stat-
ute book."197 But why? Why is it so foolish to expect continual expression
of the legislative will through continual reconsideration of the statute
book? If by continual he meant each term, then I agree. And if by fool-
ish he meant that it was not the Court's job in our current system to cre-
ate such a requirement, I also agree. But if he meant that it would be
foolish to construct a constitutional system that required a periodic and
systematic reconsideration of the law, then we part company.
Bickel was writing in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Poe v. Ullman and the selective enforcement of statutes regulating birth
contio1. 198 The birth control statute in Poe had been enforced three
times in the thirty years prior to the decision. 199 But a doctor who
191 See Stuntz, supra note 186, at 792.
192 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 212 (2005) (dis-
cussing the emergence of judicial review as the refusal to enforce laws contrary to the Con-
stitution).
193 BICREL, supra note 176, at 156.
194 Id.
199 SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 26 ("Cautious judges can promote democratic delib-
eration with more minimalist strategies, designed to bracket some of the deeper questions
but also to ensure both accountability and reflection.").
196 Bickel, supra note 149, at 61.
197 Id. at 63.
199 Poe, 367 U.S. at 498; Bickel, supra note 144, at 59.
199 Bickel, supra note 149, at 61.
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wanted to prescribe birth control was told that he could be prosecuted
for a violation of the almost universally unenforced Iaw."°
Bickel believed that the Court should reset the balance in favor of
liberty through a variety of democracy-forcing measures, which he has
famously called the passive virtues."1 He suggested desuetude as the
method through which the Poe case should be decided, but the execu-
tive chose to attempt to enforce the law only once. 2°2 As Bickel saw it,
"The unenforced statute is not, in the normal way, a continuing reflec-
tion of the balance of political pressures. When it is resurrected and en-
forced, it represents the ad hoc decision of the prosecutor, unrelated to
anything that may realistically be taken as present legislative policy." 2°8
In his consideration of any enduring vitality in the forces that led to the
anticontraception statute at issue in Poe, he also recognized that passage
and repeal were not equivalent. 2" It did not matter to Bickel that the
opponents of the unenforced statute were unable to muster a majority
to overturn it.208 "The legislature has voted against repeal," he noted,
"Nut that is not the same as voting to enact a statute." 206
Nevertheless, Bickel criticized the Court for stepping in to act in
the breach in Poe.207 Bickel believed the Court was simply the wrong
institution and considered the problem perhaps insoluble as it then
stood. 208 He believed that the Court should have waited for the statute
to be enforced and then enjoined it under the doctrine of desuetude.
In his view, Poe was the wrong case at the wrong time. 209
Bickel's concern about Poe; and cases like it, remains salient given
the countermajoritarian difficulty for cases today."' In Poe, it was clear
that the Court was grappling with a problem that is inherent in our con-
stitutional structure. 211 The system we have, with unenforced statutes
that remain in place, predictably gives rise to this problem. 212 Courts are
discouraged from reviewing statutes not on the basis of textual conflict
with the Constitution or the evenhanded administration of the laws, but
20° Id.
2°1 Id.
202 Id.
209 Id. at 63.
294 Bickel, supra note 144, at 61.
2°5 Id.
2°8 Id.
"7 Id.
K's Id.
249 Bickel, supra note 144, at 61.
210 SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 49.
2" Bickel, supra note 144, at 61.
212 Id.
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rather on the judges' own sense that times have changed. 213 The Court
arguably gets this right, sometimes, in cases such as Poe,214 or in the cases
designed to dismantle Jim Crow, such as Loving v. Virginia 215 and Brown
v. Board of Education. 216 But it has arguably gotten it wrong in other cases,
such as Furman u Georgia, where some members of the Court decided
that the American public no longer supported the death penalty. 217 And
it exacerbated a critical social and political divide and politicized the
selection of Supreme Court justices in Roe v. Wade and subsequent abor-
tion cases.218 The Court faces significant institutional hurdles that may
render it the worst branch to bear this burden; it is limited by the case
and controversy requirement, it lacks the resources to engage in ex-
tended fact-finding, and it depends on litigants and amici curiae to pre-
sent its view of the world. 219
D. Prosecutorial Discretion
Perhaps the most important safety valve for outdated criminal
codes is prosecutorial discretion. 2" In most states, elected prosecutors
operate under significant political constraints, which couple with re-
source constraints to make prosecutors unlikely to enforce unpopular
laws—especially against popular defendants. 221 Proponents of prose-
cutorial discretion argue that it is incredibly difficult to write a law
that is not somewhat overinclusive or somewhat underinclusive. 222
Overinclusive laws that empower prosecutors to enforce them in ways
215 SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 49.
214 367 U.S. at 509.
215 388 U.S. at 12.
216 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
217 408 U.S. at 239-40; See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 267 (2002) (noting that Furman 'touched off the biggest flurry of capital punish-
ment legislation the nation had ever seen"); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,
Pt. 413-14 (1994) (arguing that the Furman majority thought that the tide had turned on
the death penalty, but public support for the death penalty increased after Furman in an
apparent reaction to the decision); Carole S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 411-12 (1995) (noting that it seems fair to say that Furman galvanized
political opposition to abolition").
215 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
219 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 255-58 (exploring the limits of judicial capacities
and the judicial role).
220 See William F. McDonald, The Prosecutor's Domain, in THE PROSECUTOR 15, 17 (Wil-
liam F. McDonald ed., 1979) (discussing the role of the prosecutor in the adversarial
criminal justice system).
221 See id.
222 See Krug, supra note 18, at 645-46.
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considered fair by the majority can ameliorate the drafting problem,
but such discretion may hide problems with the substantive criminal
law. 223
 Many opponents of prosecutorial discretion argue that discre-
tion is a core component of the overcriminalization problem. 224 As
Professor Brown has noted:
Because most obscure or superfluous statutes in criminal
codes are effectively nullified by prosecutors, legislatures' in-
centives to update codes and repeal antiquated statutes are
greatly reduced. If American jurisdictions had mandatory-
prosecution policies, coupled with investigatory resources to
pursue most violations, legislatures would likely repeal crimes
much more quickly that no longer accord with majoritarian
preferences. 225
Scholars such as Donald Dripps have suggested that cabining
prosecutorial discretion might be a way to force the law on the books
closer to current sentiments. 226 If prosecutors had to enforce all laws
against all possible defendants, politically powerful or not, then the
powerful would very quickly change the laws. 227 The politically weak
would benefit as a result.228
Prosecutorial discretion comes with other costs: lack of transpar-
ency, perceived racial inequality, and all of the problems with the bu-
reaucratic oversight of agents who provide a service that is difficult to
measure. 229 Trusting prosecutors to fairly enforce the law may be effi-
cient, but it leads to concentrations of power and perceptions that
that such concentration leads to the rule of men, not laws. 23° As Pro-
fessor Stuntz puts it:
As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and .adjudication
pass into the hands of the police and prosecutors; law en-
forcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for
how long. The end point of the progression is clear: criminal
223 see id.
224 Brown, supra note 51, at 261.
225 Id.
225 Dripps, supra note 50, at 1176 ("Legislators know very well that prosecutors amelio-
rate the law in practice; the more opaque and standardless the process by which this ame-
lioration occurs, the more it favors the privileged over the disempowered.").
" 7 Id.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 132, at 438; Krug, supra note 18, at 650-52.
255 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 509.
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codes that cover everything and decide nothing, that serve
only to delegate power to district attorneys' offices and po-
lice departments. 231
. E. Jury Nullification
Another adjustment the system now makes is jury nullification. 232
Jury nullification occurs in a criminal case when a jury acquits a de-
fendant despite the government's showing of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.233 It may do so because it dislikes the law generally, or be-
cause it dislikes the particular application. 234 Although it may once
have been considered proper, conventional wisdom does not consider
it the jury's role to decide whether a law comports with current con-
ceptions of morality. 239 Juries are often instructed that it is their sworn
duty to follow the law as given to them by the trial judge, regardless of
what they might think of 11. 236 Jury nullification is controversial. 2" Ad-
vocates argue that it returns a moral dimension to the law because it
allows the jury to serve as the conscience of the community. 238 Oppo-
nents view it as a necessary evil that may introduce all sorts of biases
back into the courtroom that will undercut the rule of law. 239
221 Id.
222 See Brown, supra note 18, at 1155 (arguing that the power to nullify is an important
addition to the system that may take place within, not in contravention to, the rule of law);
Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the jury About Mandatory Sentencing Conse-
quences, 95 CoLum. L. REV. 1232, 1254-56 (1995) (arguing that the jury can serve as a
check on systemic legislative failures).
233 See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 360 (1987) (defining
jury nullification); Paul Ruder, Racially Based fury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995) (same).
234 GREENAWALT, Supra note 233, at 360.
"2 See Mum REED AMAR, THE But or RIGHTS 81-118 (1998) (discussing evolving role
of juries); Richard E. Myers II, Restoring the Peers in the -Bulwark ": Blakely v. Washington and
the Court's Jury Project, 83 N.C. L. Rtv. 1383, 1404-06 (2005).
2" See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1040 (4th ed. 2004).
2" See Brown, supra note 18, at 1149.
"8 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182-
1203 (1991) (arguing that the Framers viewed the jury's right as central to the protection
of popular and local will).
2" See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (*Nullification is, by
definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court . . . We
categorically reject the idea that, in a_society committed to the rule of law, jury nullifica-
tion is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to
prevent").
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Each of the foregoing solutions in current doctrine comes at a
cost. 240
 If, taken together, they were doing an adequate job of address-
ing the limitations of repeal, then the proposed solution would be
unnecessary. They are not, however, and a systemic solution would
simultaneously reduce the need for their exercise and decrease the
negative side effects of their appropriate exercise. 241
IV. THE CRIMINAL SUNSET AMENDMENT
One way to reduce the impact of the time lag beiween moral sen-
timents and the law would be to amend the Constitution to enact at
least part of the original Jeffersonian proposa1. 242 A Criminal Sunset
Amendment that would enact Jefferson's vision would leave each of the
current doctrinal solutions in place but would change the background
against which they operated, hopefully for the better. 243 The existing
solutions would be less dramatic in their results and less often needed if
the legislature regularly reevaluated the law on the books. 244 This sec-
tion details the early constitutional thought on sunsetting laws, the me-
chanics of the amendment itself, and the possible costs of a sunset pro-
vision.245
A. Sunsets at the Dawn of the American Constitutional Order
The idea that there should be temporal limits on legislation, or
even on the Constitution itself, is not new. 246 Thomas Jefferson pro-
posed precisely this principle to James Madison in 1789 as the Ameri-
24° See supra notes 155-239 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 276-328 and accompanying text.
242 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
242 See infra notes 276-328 and accompanying text.
244 See infra notes 279-332 and accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 246-328 and accompanying text.
246 See AMAR, supra note 192, at 62. Amar explains:
Had the Constitution disfavored all statutes, it could have required that every
federal law expire after a certain period. But it did no such thing, outside a
narrow category of laws dealing with standing armies.
Instead, the Constitution structured an ingenious system of constitutional
checks and choke points designed to minimize the likelihood that an arguably
unconstitutional federal law would pass and take effect. If constitutional inter-
preters outside the legislature deemed a statute unconstitutional, they
could—via executive pardons and nonenforcement, grand jury refusals to in-
dict, judicial review, jury acquittals, and the like—render the statute a virtual
dead letter and thereby restore a libertarian baseline for most practical pur-
poses.
Id.
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can constitutional order was being born. 247 Jefferson was drawing on an
idea that had deep roots in the radical politics of his period. 248 Noah
Webster,249 Thomas Paine, 250 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau25 ' all professed
similar views. 252 These thinkers were grappling with the radical changes
taking place in France and America, and searching for theoretical justi-
fications for those changes. 255 As Professor Rubenfeld has noted, they
were developing theories to justify their own breaks with the past at the
same time that they were writing constitutions that would claim to bind
the future legitimately. 254
Jefferson argued that every generation has a right to the constitu-
tion and laws of its own choosing. 255 In a letter to Madison dated Sep.
tember 6, 1789, Jefferson wrote, "Every constitution then, & every law,
naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an
act of force, & not of right."256 Jefferson would have sunset all laws, and
247 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
248 occ-e JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 17-18 (2001).
249 Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], On Bills of Rights, AM. MAG., Dec. 1787, at 13, 14.
Webster believed that the very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption of
the right to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate for those over
whom we have as little authority as over a nation in Asia." Id,
25° THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS or THOMAS PAINE
244. 251 (Philip S. Foner ed., Citadel Press 1961) (1791). Paine wrote, "Every age and
generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations which
preceded it." Id.
" 1 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract or Essay About the Form of the Republic
(Geneva Manuscript), in ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND Po-
LITICAL ECONOMY 157, 168 (R.D. Masters ed., J.R. Masters trans., Bedford/St. Martin's
Press 1978) (1762) ("Now the general will that should direct the State is not that of a past
time but of the present moment, and the true characteristic of sovereignty is that there is
always agreement on time, place and effect between the direction of the general will and
the use of public force.").
2" Ru BENFELD, supra note 248, at 17-18.
2" Id.
254 Id,
2" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
256 Id, For discussions of the letter, see ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE
GREAT COLLABORATION 62-96 (1950); STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 77-86 (1968); DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302-08 (1994); CHARLES A. MILLER, JEFFERSON AND NATURE: AN
INTERPRETATION 160-64 (1988); RuRENFELD, supra note 248, at 16-28; GARRY WILLS, IN-
VENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 132-48 (1978); Stanley N.
Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 Micn. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1977); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolution
ary America, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 467, 480-82 (1976); Merrill D. Peterson, Mr: Jefferson's "Sover-
eignty of the Living Generation," 52 VA. Q. REV. 437, 437-44 (1976); Merrill D. Peterson, Th.o-
mas Jefferson, the Founders, and Constitutional Change, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS
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even the Constitution itself. 287
 In Jefferson's view, the power of repeal
was an insufficient protection to liberty because it was not the equiva-
lent of the power to refuse to enact in the first instance.258 Even at the
earliest date, he recognized that the checks and balances that our Con-
stitution enacted to limit passing a law also frustrate its repeal, enabling
a determined minority to check the popular will to repea1. 259
Madison believed Jefferson's sunset proposal would create unac-
ceptable instability in property regimes, business, or inheritance, and
his views prevailed. 260 He believed that the impediments would make
ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 275-93 (J. Jackson Barlow et al. eds., 1988)
[hereinafter Peterson. Constitutional Change].
257 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385-86. The
relevant portion of Jefferson's letter to Madison states:
Every constitution then, & every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years.
If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, & not of right. It may be said that
the succeeding generation exercising in fact the power of repeal, this leaves
them as free as if the constitution or law has been expressly limited to 19 years
only. In the first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing an equiva-
lent. But the power of repeal is not an equivalent. It might be indeed if every
form of government were so perfectly contrived that the will of the majority
could always be obtained fairly & without impediment. But this is true of no
form. The people cannot assemble themselves. Their representation is un-
equal & vicious. Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition.
Factions get possession of the public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Per-
sonal interests lead them astray from the general interests of their constitu-
ents: and other impediments arise so as to prove to every practical man that a
law of limited duration is much more manageable than one which needs a
repeal.
Id.
sss Id.
259 /d.
260 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 24, at 18,18-26. The relevant passage states in full:
Unless such laws should be kept in force by new acts regularly anticipating
the end of the term, all the rights depending on positive laws, that is, most of
the rights of property would become absolutely defunct; and the most violent
struggles be generated between those interested in reviving and those inter-
ested in new-modelling the former State of property. Nor would events of this
kind be improbable. The obstacles to the passage of laws which render a
power to repeal inferior to an opportunity of rejecting, as a security agst. op-
pression, would here render an opportunity of rejecting, an insecure provi-
sion agst. anarchy. Add, that the possibility of an event so hazardous to the
rights of property could not fail to depreciate its value; that the approach of
the crisis would increase this effect; that the frequent return of periods super-
seding all the obligations depending on antecedent laws & usages, must by
weak[en]ing the reverence for those obligations, co-operate with motives to
licentiousness already too powerful; and that the uncertainty incident to such
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reenactment of critical legislation too uncertain, upsetting expecta-
tions and repeatedly laying the republic open to the corrupting influ-
ence of factions that he especially feared. 261 Even if Madison was right
in his response to the full Jeffersonian proposal—that sunsetting all
laws (and the Constitution itself) does too Much, the existing Consti-
tution arguably does too little. 262 This is particularly true in the case of
the criminal law because of the political and structural dynamics that
underlie legislation in this area and the detrimental effects, such as
overcriminalization and lack of legitimacy, that could be improved. 263
B. Modern Thinking About Sunsets
Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the political dynamics
that arise as a result of what Professor Jacob Gersen has termed "tem-
porary legislation."264 He includes in his discussion of sunsets "duration
clauses" and constitutionally mandated limits, such as those found in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 of the Constitution, which limits military
appropriations to two years. 265
a state of things would on one side discourage the steady exertions of indus-
try produced by permanent laws, and on the other, give a disproportionate
advantage to the more, over the less, sagacious and interprizing part of the
Society.
I find no relief from these consequences, but in the received doctrine that
a tacit assent may be given to established Constitutions and laws, and that this
assent may be inferred, where no positive dissent appears. It seems less im-
practicable to remedy, by wise plans of Government, the dangerous operation
of this doctrine, than to find a remedy for the difficulties inseparable from
the other.
Id. at 20. Scholars suggest that Madison's view won out. See RURENFELD, supra note 298, at
43 ("The written constitutionalism introduced by America in the late eighteenth century,
ushering democracy into the modern world, flatly rejects the ideal of democracy as gov-
ernance by the will of the living. Jefferson lost the battle over the basic contours of Ameri-
can constitutionalism?).
2131 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 260, at 20.
262 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 386.
263 See Strazzella, supra note 50, at 54 (suggesting that all federal criminal statutes have
a federal sunset provision of five years to enable "future Congresses an opportunity to as-
sess claims made prior to enactment about what a particular statute might accomplish in
dealing with crime.").
264 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CH!. L. Rim 247,247 (2007).
265 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12; Gersen, supra note 264, at 247-98. The clause grants
Congress the power "[t]t) raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. In The Federal-
ist No. 26, Hamilton justified that limitation because it would force democratic reconsid-
eration of any commitment to a standing army and would allow public debate and read-
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Professor Gersen recognizes a number of benefits that derive from
temporary legislation.266
 He observes:
From an informational perspective, temporary legislation
provides concrete advantages over its permanent cousin by
specifying windows of opportunity for policymakers to in-
corporate a greater quantity and quality of information into
legislative judgments. By redistributing the decision costs of
producing legislation, temporary measures also facilitate ex-
perimentation and adjustment in public policy. 267
Professor Gersen has written a positive account of the strengths
and weaknesses of sunsets and other time-based approaches to legal
problems. 268 His survey of such provisions shows the long, successful
history of temporary legislation in this country and abroad. 269 His ex-
amination verifies that temporary legislation should not be consid-
ered novel, strange, or suspicious. 27° In fact, he. concludes:
Temporary legislation is a staple of legislatures, both old
and modern. . . . The legislative form produces both in-
formational and distributive benefits, which affect the selec-
tion of optimal public policy and the distribution of author-
ity in government. . . . Normatively, temporary legislation
should not be globally eschewed, and at least in specific pol-
icy domains such as responses to newly recognized risk, there
should be a presumptive preference in favor of temporary
legislation. 271
In examining a number of modern uses in his article, Gersen states:
To name only a handful of applications, temporary legislation
has been used in immigration policy, taxation of life insur-
ance, election law, agricultural policy, judicial rules, interna-
tional trade policy, internet taxation, congressional responses
to judicial decisions, bankruptcy law, energy policy, telecom-
justment of fiscal commitments if it became apparent that the army might become a threat
to the liberty of the citizenry. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
266 Gersen, supra note 264, at 248.
267 id.
268 See generally id.
269 Id. at 299-50.
270 1d. at 250 (noting that an understanding of history "helps undermine the notion
that temporary legislation is a new, peculiar or particularly suspect legislative tool").
271 Gersen, supra note 264, at 298.
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munications policy, government reform, and tax policy gen-
erally. . . . State legislatures have relied equally on temporary
legislation, both historically and recently, enacting temporary
legislation to control the payments of colonial rents, to regu-
late slavery, to govern welfare policy, in the riot acts, in tax
policy, in bankruptcy policy, on physician-assisted suicide, and
even in policies on cameras in courtrooms. 272
Gersen's article demonstrates that limiting the duration of legisla-
tion in many different contexts has not been catastrophic—instead it
has had positive results. 275 His arguments in favor of temporary legisla-
tion in contexts where public understanding of a problem is changing
apply with equal force where the public's moral sentiments are subject
to change. 274 His examination of the historic record on temporary legis-
lation suggests that there is important work yet to be done by legal his-
torians to unearth the way sunsets have worked in numerous contexts. 275
C. The Structure of the Proposed Criminal Sunset Amendment
Jefferson's proposal did not command a specific mechanism, al-
though he clearly believed that these temporal limitations should ap-
ply not only to all laws, but also to the Constitution itself. 276 There are
definitely costs associated with the radical present-oriented theory of
government.277 The instability that would result in property regimes
or in regulated markets would be unacceptable. 278 There are reasons
to believe that those areas have politics that differ from the politics of
criminal law in significant ways. 279 This Article proposes a sunset
amendment limited to the criminal laws to enact part of Jefferson's
272 Id. at 255-56.
275 Id.
474 see id,
275 Id. at 249-61.
476 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
277 See THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison) ( Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison
noted the tension between these two values when he cautioned:
It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their
own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so inco-
herent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before
they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who
knows what the law is today can guess what it will be tomorrow.
Id. at 421.
27a Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 260, at 20.
474 See, e.g., Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 638; Stuntl, supra note 1, at 523-65.
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vision and respond to Madison's fears. 28° Here is the full text of the
proposed amendment:
No criminal law passed by the United States or any of the
several states may remain in effect for more than 25 years
from its date of passage. The sunset date for any criminal law
enacted prior to the date of this amendment is calculated as
follows: The year of most recent enactment will be divided by
25. The remainder plus five will be added to the date of rati-
fication of this amendment, and the law will sunset on that
date.
Any new criminal law must be passed individually through
the republican procedures of the federal government or the
state government in which it is to apply.
As drafted, the Criminal Sunset Amendment takes Jefferson's idea
of nineteen years as the age of a generation and amends it to twenty-
five years, both to reflect changes in the actuarial tables and because
twenty-five is a nice, round number. 281 Under the proposed law, ap-
proximately four percent of the criminal laws would be subject to sun-
set each year, on a rolling basis. 282 The amendment applies to both the
federal and state governments, although one could imagine significant
federalism-based arguments for applying the restrictions to the federal
government only. The amendment leaves significant uncertainty re-
garding the entire field of common law crime, which will not have been
enacted by the legislature. 283 It includes a five-year lag between the en-
,
28° Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385-86; Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 260, at 20. Professor Donald Dripps
has suggested something similar. See Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Prin-
ciple, 17 CRIM. JusT. Erittcs 3, 4 (1998). He proposed requiring a two-thirds supermajority
for all criminal laws, with a 10-year sunset. Id. "I suggest a constitutional provision that
forbids imposing penal liability not authorized by legislation which has been approved by
two-thirds of the legislature within ten years of the charged conduct." Id. at 12. His con-
temporary supermajority rule has a very different focus and analysis from this one. Id.
Jefferson's idea of a generational reevaluation of the law inspired my proposal. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385-86.
228 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385-86.
282 States that adopted comprehensive criminal codes would face years that were very
heavy on criminal legislation, although it is possible that gradual amendments to the code
would smooth that over time.
283 Some states have a reception statute, and the proposed amendment might bring all
of the common law crimes under scrutiny at the same time, based on that reception stat-
ute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (West 2005). Recently, states have moved away from
common law crimes and toward statutory codification. See DRESSLER, supra note 170, at 30.
The federal courts have stated that there is no federal common law of crimes. See United
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actment date and the first wave of sunsets, to permit the legislature
time to identify those laws due to sunset and draft replacements, either
by reenacting existing law or by proposing new law. 284
One critical feature of the amendment is the provision to require
each bill be enacted separately through the republican procedures that
each state requires for the passage of criminal laws. This prevents the
amendment's effect from devolving into a ritualistic readoption of the
criminal code at the beginning of each legislative session. This furthers
the rationing requirement by requiring individualized legislative atten-
tion to each crime. This one-crime, one-vote requirement also removes
the possibility of larding criminal bills with pork to buy passage, or of
slipping a criminal provision into another bill so that it will pass virtu-
ally unnoticed and undebated. The downside is that it will adversely
affect legislative attempts to rationalize the criminal code through pe-
riodic revision and adoption of a comprehensive criminal code.285 The
single crime provision would require a significant investment of legisla-
tive time to pass an entire criminal code piecemeal. •
1. Testing Commitments
The amendment would test some of our commitments to using the
criminal law to regulate behavior because there are restrictions on the
legislature's time. 286 There are potential substitutes for criminal law,
given the multiple social and legal sources for the rights and responsi-
bilities that society holds paramount. 287 Law is only one way to deal with
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The common law could
serve as an emergency backstop in the event of process failure, so even proponents of the
proposed sunset legislation might feel more comfortable leaving the common law in place.
See DRESSI.ER, supra note 170, at 30-32. A careful consideration of the merits of common
law crimes and their enforcement is beyond the scope of this Article.
284 The amendment as drafted might have the perverse result of more recent laws ex-
piring sooner than older laws, but that would be true only during the first twenty-five years
after it takes effect.
"a For a positive account of the value of such periodic revisions, see generally Paul H.
Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. Km 159 (1995). For a more recent
analysis of their degradation over time due . to the primacy of ordinary politics, see Robin-
son & Cahill, supra note 7, at 638. It would be possible to draft around this by making an
exception for those states that choose to adopt and maintain a comprehensive code.
288 See Gersen, supra note 264, at 260 (discussing the 1970s and 1980s sunset legislation
that imposed considerable administrative costs on the reviewing legislative committees).
287 See ELLICKSON, supra note 61, at 131; see also GARLAND, supra note 6, at 49 (discuss-
ing the Informal social controls exerted by families, neighbours and communities, to-
gether with the disciplines imposed by schools, workplaces and other institutions" as a
framework of norms and sanctions that support the law).
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a moral commitment, and a particularly inflexible one. 288 Family, relig-
ion, educational institutions, and social networks are all additional
sources of inculcation and enforcement of these values. 269 Over time,
the appropriate mix of these sources changes, as 'does the way in which
each approaches a particular situation. 290 These norm-enforcement
resources can be optimally allocated. 291 If society believes there are cer-
tain actions in which no person may responsibly engage, then it likely
will continue to ban them outright. 292 The issue becomes significantly
more difficult when there can be a responsible and an irresponsible
exercise of the same behavior. 295 For those behaviors, we resort to a va-
riety of sorting mechanisms—we license the behavior so that we can
sort the actors who may engage in it; we turn the behavior from a right
to a revocable privilege; we permit the behavior but focus on the irre-
sponsible exercises of it; we ban the harmful results, not the behavior.294
The Criminal Sunset Amendment will permit us to reassess which of
these tools we wish to employ with regard to the particular behavior in
light of revealed practice under the criminal law.
2. Changing Views of the World
The criminal law might need to change for other reasons. The way
we understand the world changes—often dramatically—over time. We
can expect regular adjustment of at least some commitments based on
politics, religion, and science in a democratic, pluralistic, and techno-
logically advanced society 295 Technological advancement may amelio-
rate the harm that resulted from a particular behavior. 296 Changing
288 GARLAND, supra note 6, at 49.
289 See id.
28° See id, at 158-63.
291 See TYLER, supra note 109, at 22-27.
282 See id. at 23.
29' See id. (discussing attempts to reduce incidents of drunk driving).
284 See id.
295 see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 188 (1986).
If people accept that they are governed not only by explicit rules laid down in
past political decisions but by whatever other standards flow from the princi-
ples these decisions assume, then the set of recognized public standards can
expand and contract organically, as people become more sophisticated in
sensing and exploring what these principles require in new circumstances,
without the need for detailed legislation or adjudication on each possible
point of conflict.
Id.
288 See RonmsoN DARLEY, supra note 20, at 5-7 (arguing that community views on
morality should dictate the criminal laws).
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views on race, gender, or pluralism may change the way we regulate be-
havior. 297 A changing religious composition of the electorate may re-
quire reexamination of the religious underpinnings of much of secular
law. Conversely, new conceptions of harms may emerge which will alter
attitudes toward specific behavior. 298
For example, antimiscegenation laws based on moral commitment
to the separation of the races were once commonplace. 299 They had
deep roots in religion, social structures, and pseudoscience for a sig-
nificant portion of American history.") We fought a war to overturn the
principal social structure that underlay them and then spent a century
adjusting our other values before the Supreme Court constitutionalized
the commitment to racial equality in the Jim Crow cases.ml
Likewise, as science changes the relationship between behavior
and consequences, harm-based moral commitments can be expected
to change as cause and effect are reevaluated. For example, a moral
commitment to chastity that is based partly on the fear of unwanted
pregnancy, and unknown or unknowable paternity, appears different
when contraception and DNA testing alter the relationship between
the behavior and the problem. This is not to suggest that, on balance,
society will inevitably change its moral commitments in light of new
information. There may be significant reasons to remain opposed to a
particular behavior, but technological advancement can significantly
alter the balance of harms.
3. Putting Policy into Action
We may adapt the mix of methods used to actualize a retained
commitment, or we might significantly change our commitment. In
either case, the inputs into important decisions regarding criminal law
policy will change over time. Given these changes, it is worth periodi-
cally forcing society through the exercise of renewing its commitment
to criminal policy in light of new information.
A change in the basic constitutional structure like the Sunset
Amendment would have deep and wide systemic effects, fundamentally
altering the balance of power between institutional players. Readers
familiar with the political science literature on positive political theory
291 See id.
298 See id.
299 ILAummt, supra note 37, at 63.
299 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
301 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 37.
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of law will recognize the Sunset Amendment as an attempt to imagine
the effect on the American political system of a new balance among
legislative power, veto gates, executive power, bureaucratic power, and
the reversionary outcome in the event of inaction. 902 Positive political
theory and the public choice school of economics both spend signifi-
cant energy on studying the concept of the veto gate, which places
power with particular institutional players to block legislation from go-
ing forward."' A person or group that controls a veto gate may deny
even a firm opposing majority the ability to adopt a new poiicy. 304 The
result of this power depends on the reversionary policy in the particu-
lar system."' Reversionary policy is the default the system applies if the
legislature and associated veto players fail to take action.'" It might be
the status quo ante, but it might be something different. 3 Q7 Where there
are sunset provisions, the reversionary policy is not the status quo but
the absence of the sunsetting policy. Thus, "[p] °skive agenda control
confers much greater power if the reversionary policy is no policy at all,
as with budgets and sunset provisions, than if the reversionary policy is
a continuation of the status quo." 308 Positive political theory predicts
that a change like the Criminal Sunset Amendment, which makes
sweeping changes to the reversionary policy, will empower the actors
who control agendas at the expense of the rest of the body politic.'"
Recall the overbreadth and overdepth concerns raised by the limi-
tations of repeal.' 1° The Criminal Sunset Amendment would address
"2 McNollgast, supra note 145, at 1652 (defining positive political theory as how the
structure and process of legislative, bureaucratic and judicial decision-making influences
the law," and evaluating "these procedures using the principle of democratic legitimacy").
595 Id. at 1685-86. McNollgast explains:
Any person or group with the power to block or significantly to delay policy is
referred to as a veto gate or gatekeeper. • . The United States . . . repre-
sents the end of the spectrum with a large number of veto gates because it has
a bicameral legislature that is decentralized into numerous committees plus a
President with veto power. In the House of Representatives alone, the sub-
stantive committees and their subcommittees, the Rules Committee, the
Speaker and the Committee of the Whole each constitute veto gates through
which legislation normally must pass, and the Senate has even more veto
gates due to their lax restrictions on debate.
Id.
304 Id.
"5 Id. at 1686.
3°
307 McNollgast, supra note 145, at 1686.
595 Id.
"9 See id.
310 See supra notes 99-134 and accompanying text.
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both issues. Unlike many of the philosophical critiques that test the
breadth of the law against first principles, for a republican like Jeffer-
son, the test of the breadth question is ultimately democratic." Setting
aside for a moment the generational effects of the Bill of Rights pre-
cluding certain classes of crime from ever entering the criminal code
without regard to current sentiments, the elected legislatures are the
representatives of the current generation. 312 The Sunset Amendment is
intended to enforce the "principles of democratic legitimacy," in that it
seeks to align the moral statements of the criminal law with the current
moral judgment of the community as spoken by its representatives. 313
By forcing periodic reconsideration at some point during each genera-
tion, the Criminal Sunset Amendment would determine whether the
law on the books reflected current moral and political values. 314 It
would make legislators currently accountable for the state of the law;
they cannot blame their predecessors and the bureaucrats, in this case
police and prosecutors, when a particular class of cases proves unpopu-
lar. 315 Mandatory sunset would potentially rationalize the political
statement that a decision to criminalize conduct makes; or it would at
least reduce message confusion because of the greater symmetry be-
tween a prior vote to criminalize conduct and a current failure to vote
to decriminalize conduct. 316
The Criminal Sunset Amendment also addresses the overdepth
issue by creating scarcity. 3" Passing legislation is expensive and time-
consuming. 318 Rather than pass, for example, four hundred statutes
addressing false statements in different contexts, the legislatures will
ration the false statements crimes and also ensure that the conduct it
wants prohibited remains covered. Fewer choices for the system may
result in a less flexibility, but it will enhance the rule of law. 319 Addidon-
ally, the amendment would render the revival problem moot by impos-
311 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 24, at 385.
31!
	 Beak, supra note 8, at 773-74.
3" Set McNollgast, supra note 145, at 1685.
314 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
313
	 Dripps, supra note 50, at 1176.
316 See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
317 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 639 (describing the problems that the
criminal code's depth creates for interpretations of laws, the law's moral authority, and
notice requirements).
318 McNollgast, supra note 145, at 1687.
316 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 644 (arguing that the criminal code's depth
created by overlapping statutes causes harm because it treats less serious offenses more
harshly and calls into question the law's moral authority).
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ing a libertarian bias on the system. 320 Recall that the revival problem
arises when a statute that was deemed unconstitutional remains on the
books, subject to possible revival at a later date if the courts reverse
course."' Because such statutes are unlikely to be reenacted after a
court rules they are unconstitutional, over time those statutes would fall
off the books. 322
Legislatures, interest groups, and prosecutors all would have an
incentive to monitor the code for provisions set to sunset and would
seek to have the ones they wanted to maintain slated for reenactment.
It is easy to envision a standing committee on the criminal code with a
staff of attorneys who would propose legislation each session to revise
and maintain the code as necessary. 323 One possible benefit of the new
dynamic would be a realignment of prosecutorial interests. 324 Prosecu-
tors tend to be particularly conservative about the law already on the
books and particularly influential before the legislature. 325 They have
an institutional interest in retaining a broad range of charging options
and an interest in retaining statutes that have been considered and up-
held by the courts. 526 The new dynamic, which inherently requires leg-
islative action, might align prosecutorial and good government inter-
ests in favor of clearly drafted statutes. 327
The Amendment would also limit some of the problems associated
with judicial enforcement of current social mores through its interpre-
tation of open-textured constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court
may not be in a position to mandate continual expression of the legisla-
tive will, but that is a failure of the Constitution, and one that would be
remedied by the Criminal Sunset Arnendment. 328 If the system forth-
rightly sent the criminal code back to the legislature on a regular basis
for such a recalibration, then many of the unintended consequences—
and the distrust of the judiciary that results—could be avoided.
s" See Treanor & Sperling, supra note 112, at 1903.
321 See id.
322 See id. It is possible that the legislature might opt to reenact a law that has been
deemed unconstitutional. For example, in 2006, South Dakota explicitly enacted a law
making abortion a crime. See S.D. Conti-1En LAWS § 22-17-7 (2005 & Supp. 2008). Legisla-
tors knew that the law was unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent but
enacted it solely for the purpose of forcing the Supreme Court to revisit the issue. See id.
325 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 7, at 653-54 (recommending a standing law
commission to oversee and review criminal law reform).
324 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 534.
525 See id.
520 See id.
"7 See id.
928 See U.S. CON ST. art.
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V. COSTS OF PASSING THE CRIMINAL SUNSET AMENDMENT
We can readily anticipate different critiques to the Criminal Sun-
set Amendment, each of which could be, or has been, the basis of a
separate paper."9 Some would be aimed at the reduction in perceived
responsibility that each of the branches will feel in light of the new
legal regime's temporary nature.") Others would be aimed at the in-
creased overall costs to the system, as existing problems with democ-
ratic rule are exacerbated by cycling more often through an already
flawed system.331 Finally, there is value to a system with the appearance
of dealing with eternal verities, or truths about man and his behavior
that come from outside the political system." 2 Given these concerns,
we can expect to hear the criticisms in the following subsections.
A. Might the Amendment Do Too Much?
One possible criticism is the sweeping nature of the change—the
Amendment simply does too much, given the nature of the problem.
One suggestion made in response to the ideas in this Article is drafting
the Amendment to address only malum prohiltitum crimes, rather than
crimes that are malum in Se" At the very least, murder should be easy
to exempt, shouldn't it? Such an approach is ultimately circular. It de-
pends on our ability to divine within the current criminal code certain
crimes that are truly immoral, or wrong in themselves. It then collapses
"9 Sunsets enjoyed a brief vogue in the 1970s. See Gersen, supra note 264, at 260. Good
government advocates suggested that sunsets would be an excellent way to check the newly
burgeoning administrative state by forcing agencies to return to the legislature for reau-
thorization. See generally Bruce Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28
ADMIN. L. REv. 511 (1976) (describing the use of sunsets as a method for controlling bu-
reaucracies); Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in Sunset Legis-
lation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 Anium, L. Rev. 393 (1981) (describing sunset
laws); Dan IL Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. Ray. 401 (1978)
(using historical analysis to evaluate the ''Sunset Movement").
39) See Gersen, supra note 264, at 266 ("By requiring that future-period legislatures re-
enact policy, the current-period majority exercises agenda control, transfers decision costs
to the future, and makes current-period legislative bargains vulnerable to changes in legis-
lative preferences").
331 See id. at 264-66 (comparing the relative enactment and maintenance costs between
temporary legislation and permanent legislation).
33s
	 id. at 271 (advocating for temporary legislation to make policy in areas of newly
recognized risk).
333 Malum pivhibitum is defined as '`an act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited
by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
444 (3d pocket ed. 2006). Malum in se is defined as crime or act that is inherently im-
moral." Id.
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to a substantive analysis based on some external defining principle,
drawn from philosophy or religious commitments. These supercom-
mitments undermine the validity of the Sunset Amendment, which de-
pends on regular legislative oversight as the mechanism for testing the
currency of any of these philosophies. 334
The courts make such adjustments all the time through interpreta-
tion or reinterpretation of existing statutory language. 335 judicial rein-
terpretation of statutes conies at significant institutional risk.'" The
Supreme Court stepped in to make a critical value judgment on the
appropriate penalties for murder in Furman v. Geargia. 337 It abolished at
least one version of the death penalty, with some predicting that it was
the first step toward total abolition. 338 But it missed on its calibration of
popular sentiment regarding capital punishment, and it was forced to
backtrack.339
One could argue that the political back and forth shows an imper-
fect, not broken, system that has accommodated society's varying views
over time. Reopening old debates on apparently fixed questions is not
necessarily a good thing, and the checks the Framers chose show the
importance of a Burkean conservatism—in the close cases it is not so
bad if things are wrongly decided, so long as they are decided, as it re-
moves the rancor that comes from public debate. 34° According to this
view, only when criminal law strays too far from the once-achieved con-
sensus and cries out for repeal is the resulting social dislocation justi-
fied. If there is a fixed time for reconsideration of the murder statute,
for example, it will create a lobbying target for those forces who want to
reassess the definition of human life. Although a naive proponent of
the Criminal Sunset Amendment would believe that core statutes, such
as those criminalizing murder or rape, would require little legislative
attention, this person is overlooking the vitality of deeply committed
interest groups that would be willing to bear the political costs of en-
forced holdout. And if murder would present significant difficulties, an
sss See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 20, at 5-7 (defending the reasons community
views should dictate the criminal code).
S" See DRESSLER, SUPra note 170, at 31-32.
"6 See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 217, at 267; JEFTRIEs, supra note 217, at 413-14; Steiker,
& Steiker, supra note 217, at 411-12.
337 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
sss Id.
s" See BANNER, supra note 217, at 267; JEFFRIES, supra note 217, at 413-14; Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 217, at 411-12.
so See Peterson, supra note 256, at 290.
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opponent can argue, it becomes clear that the rationing effect would
render sunsetting all criminal legislation too costly for it to be effective.
B. Will We Undermine Legislative Commitment?
A second concern is that legislatures will take their job less seri-
ously because they know that the legislation is only temporary. 341 Pro-
fessor Adrian Vermeule suggests that "the knowledge that a given law
contains a sunset provision lowers the stakes of enacting it and may
thus detract from . . . legislative deliberation."342 If that critique is true
for particular statutes that contain a sunset provision within them, a
similar effect might be predicted for all criminal law if the Constitution
were to force all criminal laws to sunset. 349 The structure of the Crimi-
nal Sunset Amendment, with a generation-long commitment to the
new law, undermines this criticism because the enacted policy will re-
main for the likely tenure of all of its current members and for much of
the political life of the generation of voters who elected them.
A related risk is the possibility that gridlock will lead the legislature
to drop the ball and fail to readopt a murder statute, for example. 344
This is possible given the possibility that there will be vehement dis-
agreement about the broader contours of the murder statute. The po-
litical costs would be potentially catastrophic, however, so it is extremely
unlikely that the legislature would let the core of the intentional mur-
der statute lapse because of a debate about beginning or end of life is-
sues. The possibility that a key statute might lapse also invites questions
regarding the possible role of the courts and the common law as a
backstop to the legislature. 345 If the legislature knows that the courts
will act as a backstop, it is possible that they will be more inclined to let
key statutes lapse. An increased reliance on the courts to create crimi-
nal common law may actually undercut the amendment's professed
legality goals.m This criticism is self-limiting because the courts in most
states simply lack that power; most states have abolished the creation of
new common law crimes by statute. 347
ml See Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS Lj. 871, 887 (2005).
342 See id.
"3 See id.
344 See Gersen, supra note 264, at 265 (discussing the maintenance costs necessary to
keep a statute from sunsetting).
315 See DRESSIER, supra note 170, at 31-32.
"3 See ALLEN, supra note 170, at 82.
347 See DRESSLER, supm note 170, at 30.
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C. Will It Undercut the Courts' Substantive Role?
It is also possible that courts will be less willing to strike down legis-
lation that they know is only temporary. They already prefer to leave
the enforcement of a great many rights to the legislature, and propo-
nents of an active judiciary would prefer that the stakes remain high.
The Criminal Sunset Amendment would shift the balance of power
away from the courts and make their appropriate role more limited, as
it would deprive particular judicial tools of some of their power. 348
Tools such as desuetude and judicial pronouncements regarding wide-
spread changes in social mores will be more limited because they will
be operating in light of recent legislative pronouncements. 349 Those
recent pronouncements will be more likely to reflect current judg-
ments of the renegotiated balance between the social forces and con-
cerns, thereby reducing the courts' watchdog role.35° Supporters of the
amendment would consider this a benefit, not a cost. Keeping the
courts in check is an intended consequence of passing the amendment.
Even if it is a cost, it is an option so rarely exercised as to make each
instance remarkable. 351
D. Will It Overburden the Legislature?
The next criticism is that rationing of the criminal law and the per-
petual strain on the legislative calendar will tie already overworked legis-
latures in knots.352 Reigniting fresh battles over criminal laws for which
there is widespread support, but where a significant minority is commit-
ted to deeply held outlier beliefs, is counterproductive and unsettling to
society.353 The organized minority may be able to block passage of widely
341 See Bickel, supra note 144, at 62-63.
345 See id.
35° See Beale, supra note 8, at 773-74.
351 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957). In the most famous
federal example, Lambert tt California, the court struck down a Los Angeles ordinance re-
quiring felons to register. Id. The dissent presciently predicted the holding to be a "a dere-
lict on the waters of the law," as it has never been followed. Id. at 232 (Frankfurter, j., dis-
senting) •
352 Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?
112 MARV. L. REV. 379, 401 (1998) (citing jAmEs M. BUCHANAN & CORDON TULLOCR, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSITTUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43-84
(1962)). Zelinsky summarizes, "The legislative process is not costless; time and man-hours
devoted to one piece of legislation are not available for others; by expending political capi-
tal on one law, a legislator has less to expend on others; even routine legislation can absorb
significant amounts of legislative time, energy, and decisionmaking capacity.' Id.
353 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 260, at 20.
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desired legislation, leading to a net loss for the public . good. Conversely,
the minority might have to endure the pain of losing the battle repeat-
edly, renewing resentments and possibly radicalizing the minority.
Creating a focal point in time for such deeply held beliefs may in
fact be unsettling, but such political battles are part of the rough and
tumble of democratic politics. Ensuring that there will be a time when
the nation or the state will be forced to reexamine a particular policy
will allow the public to focus its energy On issues that matter to them
at a specified time. This agenda-setting function is a net good because
it may help to overcome the inertia that now excessively empowers
vocal and organized minorities. It also might give solace to losers in
the democratic system because they will know with certainty that the
issue and their objections will be revisited.
E. Will It Exacerbate Public Choice Problems?
Perhaps special interests will be excessively empowered, increasing
their ability to impede legislation. 354 Public choice theory already sug-
gests that democracy is deeply flawed because rational actors pursue
their own self-interests, singly or in combinations, in ways that harm the
public good.355 The Criminal Sunset Amendment would increase the
opportunities for these self-interested actors to do that harm. Some leg-
islative process scholarship suggests that public-regarding "republican
moments" are rare because they require public attention to the process,
and that can be fleeting. 556 As envisioned by Professor Pope:
Republican moments have five defining features. . . . (1)
[Marge numbers of Americans engage in serious political dis-
course; (2) their arguments are couched primarily in moral
rather than pecuniary terms and appeal to the common good
rather than private interest; . . . (3) the subjects of the debate
include fundamental aspects of the social, political, or eco-
nomic order[;] . . (4) representative politics are overshad-
owed by extra-institutional forms of citizen participation such
354 See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in
the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 356-58 (2006).
355 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
356 Republican moments are more common than the exceedingly rare "constitutional
moments," as defined by Professor Bruce Ackerman, but are considered exceptions from
ordinary politics. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 288, 311 (1990).
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as popular assemblies, militant protest, and civil disobedience;
and (5) social movements and voluntary associations displace
interest groups and political parties as the leading forms of
political organization. 357
Classic republican moments are rare, but smaller republican upsurges,
driven by factors one, two, and three, might occur more often. The
Criminal Sunset Amendment would limit the lasting impact of these
rare, public-regarding moments, ultimately undercutting the occasional
upwelling of American virtue. Public attention is also rationed by voters
who are "rationally ignorant," 358 and will be "wasted" on re-fighting
these old battles. In a similar vein, the conditions that gave rise to par-
ticular legislation might be forgotten. For example, the worst of the
abuses that led to food and drug regulation or the market failures that
led to the Great Depression and subsequent securities regulation have
faded from modern memories. Some might worry that a modern legis-
lature would let laws lapse because they no longer fully appreciate the
continuing need for them. .
This is a troubling issue. The rise of public interest groups, how-
ever, such as environmental and consumer lobbying organizations,
will create a counterbalancing interest. Moreover, having a fixed date
to focus lobbying and drafting efforts might make it easier for such
groups to organize public attention on particular issues, especially at
the federal level. 559
F. Will It Create the Perception of Instability?
Another significant cost of the Criminal Sunset Amendment may
be perceived instability. The amendment would alter the traditional
American balance, now considered very stable, which may have mul-
tiple hidden, beneficial effects. 359 The high number of veto players in
357 See id.
358 Political economists say rational ignorance occurs because voters know that the
marginal effect of their vote is low and the cost of gaining information on multiple issues is
high, so they reduce their participation in the political process unless the outcomes of
politics become so unbearable that the cost-benefit balance tips. See generally ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY Or DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE AcrioN (1965).
353 Because the amendment would apply to all fifty states as well, there might be a
movement by the well-organized groups to increase federal preemption of state law, par-
ticularly in the consumer and environmental protection arenas.
383 McNollgast, supra note 145, al 1687 (citing Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCub-
bins, The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes, is PRESMENTS, PARLIAMENTS
AND POLICY 65-66 (2001)).
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the American system, and the conservative bias that results, makes this
possible. 361
As the number of effective veto players increases, the govern-
ment's ability to be resolute (to commit to policy) increases
while its ability to be responsive (to change policy) de-
creases. . . . While numerous veto points reduce policy insta-
bility, the cost is that government action tends to be more re-
sponsive to particularistic interests rather than to broad policy
goals than would be the case if the Constitution made a dif-
ferent tradeoff between resoluteness and responsiveness. This
Constitutional structure does not imply an absence of collec-
tive goods or public-regarding legislation. Rather the tradeoff
created by the Constitution shapes the terrain of policy ten-
dencies that pervade lawmaking.362
Additionally, there is some value in certain criminal prohibitions
being venerable. Laws that have been with us since time immemorial,
that echo universal religious proscriptions and that are a core part of
our culture, may earn more loyalty than laws that are seen as subject to
regular change. The moral authority of the law might be undermined if
it becomes apparent that crimes are not universal wrongs but are in-
stead legislative determinations. Conversely, the law might be under-
mined further if it turns out that our old commitments were wrong, and
people remain in prison for conduct we no longer consider criminal.
Supporters would respond that repeated passage of essentially the
same criminal prohibition will increase, not decrease the sense that so-
ciety is committed to the particular value. Laws that have been re-
adopted since time immemorial are reinforced, not undermined, by
going through the process. Refinement over time will improve and
strengthen the criminal law. Forcing the system through the process of
restating its commitments is one way to sort the wheat from the chaff.
Rather than creating a perception of instability; it will demonstrate re-
solve as it tightens and focuses the expressive function of the law.
G. Will It Overburden the Frayed Civil/Criminal Distinction?
The Criminal Sunset Amendment would place additional pressure
on the courts to define the civil/criminal line clearly because it adds an
361 Seeid.
S62 See id.
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additional political check on any legislation deemed criminal. 363 The
Supreme Court already struggles with this issue, and commentators are
deeply divided on how to find a principled basis for drawing the line. 364
An important underlying concern in this area is. the substance/process
debate over what makes law "criminal" in the first instance. 365 Many
scholars argue that something intrinsic within the nature of the law it-
self—the way in which it bans behavior, or perhaps the way in which it
exacts punishment—places it on the criminal side of the civil/criminal
line. 366 The Supreme Court sees the legislatures as ascendant in decid-
ing what behavior deserves condemnation as criminal, with only minor
policing taking place at the outer boundaries. 367 However the issue is
decided, the Constitution guarantees certain additional prcicedural
protections once that choice is made. 368
Much ink has been spilled on the civil/criminal distinction, and,
in recent years, on its precipitous decliale. 363 The criminal law is differ-
ent from civil law for a number of important reasons. Here are a few of
the claims that scholars and the Supreme Court have made about the
difference:
• The criminal law has a socializing role as a system of moral edit-
cation.3"
• The criminal law exists to "focus censure and blame" or to inflict
punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma and censure. 371
363 The civil/criminal distinction is used to decide numerous procedural rights, such
as the right to a trial by jury and the right to an appointed attorney. See Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding-
and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1348-57 (1990).
364 See id.; Kevin Cole, Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 249
(1996); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between Criminal Law and
Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1795, 1837-40 (1992).
363 See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 363, at 1350-57 (discussing the various schools of
thought); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures, a Framework for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 397-413 (1976).
356 See Clark, supra note 365, at 397-413.
367 See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996) (citing legislative intent as
the primary factor in determining whether a case is civil or criminal, and refusing to dis-
turb that determination absent clear proof that the proceeding was "so punitive either in
purpose or effect" that the Court must find otherwise (citing United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980))).
ar.8 See Stun tz, Civil-Criminal, supra note 3, at 3-4.
569 See Coffee, supra note 94, at 375; John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflec-
tions on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Duties and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics,
19 AM, CRIM. L. REV. 117, 117 (1981).
37° TYLER, supra note 109, at 176-78.
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• The criminal law prohibits actions, as if they had no social utility,
while the civil law prices actions, by exacting from actors the cost
beyond the social utility of their actions. 372
• The criminal law has multiple procedural protections designed in
part to signify the difference in kind to society: trial by jury, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, ex post facto
protections, and regularization under the Eighth Amendment."'
• The criminal law carries consequences such as the loss of critical
civil rights, perhaps most critically the right to vote, and other so-
cial costs, such as the loss of benefits and the exclusion from mul-
tiple professions and jobs. 374
If the Criminal Sunset Amendment were adopted, the legislature,
in order to guard its time, would revert to noncriminal government
sanctions and social sanctions for some of the behavior that is now
criminalized. One significant downside to substituting the civil law for
the criminal law is the loss of the procedural protections that the
criminal law provides."' Critics already decry the use of civil commit-
ment in place of criminal punishment for sex offenders, for example. 376
They argue that the legislature has gone too far in this direction and
that an amendment that encourages expansion of this trend is perni-
cio s. •
At the margins, the distinctions between criminal law and puni-
tive civil regimes are often difficult to fathom. As Professor Aaron
Fellmeth has said: "To the discredit of the juristic and legislative pro-
fessions, the centrality of the distinction between the civil and crimi-
nal law to our jurisprudential paradigm has done nothing to enhance
its clarity or its cogency."37 But the differences matter. The retributiv-
671 John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE U. 1875, 1876 (1992).
572 Cole, supra note 364, at 254; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COMM. L. REV.
1523, 1532 (1984).
979 LAFAVE, supra note 236, at 45.
374 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 6.
376 See LAFAVE, supra note 236, at 45.
376 See, e.g., Mark W. Pearce, Civilly Committing Criminals: An Analysis of the Expressive
Function of Nebraska's "Dangerous Sex Offender" Commitment Procedure, 85 NErl. L. REV. 575,
577 (2007) (arguing that "the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders can, under
certain circumstances, distort the interrelationship between criminal responsibility and
psychological impairment that underlies the basic institutions of criminal justice and civil
commitment in the United States"); Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commit-
ment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1424-25 (2008).
977 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94
GEo. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
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ist component that is a central element of the criminal law is sup-
posed to be an expression of the moral condemnation of society and
the basis for exclusion from full participation in society. 978 If a society
chooses to make someone an outcast, either actual or virtual, it has
special responsibilities to define and exercise the sanction. This issue
is not easily resolved. It is possible that, by emphasizing the centrality
of the distinction, the amendment will lead to additional focus on the
problem and the development of doctrinal solutions.
Each of the foregoing criticisms identifies real potential costs to
passing the Criminal Sunset Amendment. Astute readers will be able
to identify more, but they should also be able to identify other bene-
fits to making sure the criminal law accurately identifies our current
moral judgmen ts.
H. Is It Worth Doing?
Note that nothing in the proposal would bar legislatures from
adopting exactly the same statutes that they have in place, nor does it,
in any way, guarantee that a harsher law would not replace the exist-
ing law when the time comes to reassess the crime. Recent scholarship
by David Garland and others on the explosion of the use of the penal
system as an instrument of social control suggests that we may still see
mounting punishment even in a system where politicians must invest
significant political capital to implement it."
Some critics suggest that the system will go from a default of stasis
to a default of action.38° Where nothing is happening, these critics ar-
gue, at least things are not getting worse. Criminal laws might be passed
more readily if there is a steady stream of bills coming up that are nec-
essary simply to maintain the status quo. An already excessively punitive
culture might use the opportunity to increase penalties when the legis-
lation returns for a vote. It is also possible that, by rationing the crimi-
nal law, the enforced scarcity might result in higher penalties attached
to fewer statutes. The proposed amendment, however, does reset the
checks and balances because criminal laws that were passed in exigent
circumstances would be reconsidered on another day when passions
578 PACKER, supra note 94, at 37-39.
379 GARLAND, supra note 6, at 199 ("Imprisonment has emerged in its revived, rein-
vented form because it is able to serve a newly necessary function in the workings of late
modern, neo-liberal societies: the need for a 'civilized' and 'constitutional' means of seg-
regating the problem populations created by today's economic and social arrangements.").
80 I thank Professors Louis Bilionis, Donald Hornstein, and Bill Marshall for these ob-
servations.
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have cooled. Every generation would reassess criminal laws to deter-
mine whether they meet the demands of the times. For sunsetting laws,
there would be twenty-five years of historic practice to consider when
deciding whether the laws were effective and how to update them to
make them more so. Those twenty-five years of practice would also re-
veal the price of the law's unintended consequences. Until the law is
passed, it is impossible to say how much of the majority that passed it
would have been willing to buy it at the newly revealed price..
For some readers, any possible benefits might come at too high a
cost. Legislative primacy in this area would be amplified, and although
the checks and balances might operate more often at the legislative
stage, the systems we have evolved to operate as a check at later stages
would be affected too. The legal regime we have developed over time
for ameliorating the harshest costs of the criminal system— prosecuto-
rial discretion, sentencing considerations, desuetude, lenity, and a vig-
orous set of substantive protections based on various textual provi-
sions—would face renewed opposition along multiple fronts because
the regime would be operating in contravention to the recently stated
will of the people. The costs of legislative primacy might send repercus-
sions throughout the system. It would test the nation's rhetorical com-
mitment to the will of the people. We might find that the Framers' fears
of the dangers of faction were not at all exaggerated, and that the very
fact that the ameliorative regime operates behind the mostly closed
doors of the legal system is in fact liberty-enhancing, not liberty-
reducing."1 It is possible that prosecutorial discretion exercised in se-
cret permits us to maintain a rhetorical moral stance while reducing
the actual costs on the ground. Those who want more liberty and mercy
might find that they are more likely to get it if it is rationed out in indi-
vidual cases where the equities can be considered.
Where one stands on the Criminal Sunset Amendment depends in
part on whether one thinks there is value in reinvigorating politics in
the criminal arena. Politics comes with costs. We might see more log-
rolling, like special interest groups and legislators trading favorable
votes on one important criminal measure for favorable votes on other
legislation: White-collar crime regimes might be particularly vulnerable
to well-financed special interests. Legislative-process-failure scholars
already decry closed door deals cut on particular provisions." 2 More
process might mean more process failure. Renewed interest group ac-
381 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 ( James Madison).
383 SeeMAsitAw , supra note 355, at 84-85.
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tion might result in additional legislator rent-extraction. And political
battles expend emotional energy. Is it good for society to reopen politi-
cal wounds every quarter century on such volatile issues as the demi-
don of a human being? If the politics of the criminal law are genuinely
pathological, a vigorous sunsetting regime would exacerbate at least
some of the problems inherent in the system.
The Criminal Sunset Amendment leaves it to renewed political
debate to decide on the normative bases for deciding how much crimi-
nal law is enough. The Amendment uses structure to enforce an essen-
tially democratic system, but with a pro-liberty bias. If society cannot
agree that behavior is worthy of current condemnation, then it would
not be labeled a crime. Because this is a process-forcing amendment, in
can operate easily in conjunction with other substantive, normative
commitments. At the very least, it will extract information about cur-
rent majority views and provide a more informed backdrop for action
by the other branches of government.
A true Burkean conservative might never be convinced by the ar-
guments in this Article. For the Burkean, the venerable status of a law is
a significant benefit, not a cost. 383 For the non-Burkean readers of this
Article, however, the time lag problem may be considered sufficiently
important that the polity should take measures short of a constitutional
amendment. Although this article has proposed a comprehensive solu-
tion, in part to fully illustrate the nature of the problem, I am quite
sure that measures short of the full sunset amendment would make
significant inroads into the time lag problem. For example, a particular
state, when redrafting its criminal code, might decide to place a sunset
provision on all of the substantive crimes included therein. A state legis-
lature might also adopt a standing rule that criminal provisions be con-
sidered singly, and that any new criminal provision last for only twenty-
five years. Although such half measures might be less than ideal based
on the arguments in this Article, they would constitute a significant im-
provement over the current state of the law.
CONCLUSION
Even if Madison was right to reject the full Jeffersonian proposal to
sunset all laws and the Constitution, the current system does too little.
The "act of force" by one generation on its successors is especially criti-
cal when that act chooses who the successor generation brands as a
5S9 See Peterson, Constitutional Change, supra note 256, at 290.
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criminal. If we believe that past generations had different values from
their successors, the problem is worse.
Examination of the time-based failures of the criminal law, as illu-
minated by the proposed Sunset Amendment, underscores the essen-
tially conservative design of our system. Whether or not one thinks a
sunset regime is a good idea, the absence of a constitutional mecha-
nism to account for change over time and to ration the law on the
books has affected the development of. our system of separation of
powers. Simply recognizing the role of generational lag in our criminal
justice system has significant explanatory power. An amendment to the
Constitution is unlikely, but there are other ways short of that to im-
plement .the ideas in this Article. States might pass their own sunset
amendments. Penal code drafters could design rolling sunset provi-
sions to require a phased second look at the substantive laws. Legisla-
tion creating regulatory schemes could mandate sunsets or reexamina-
tion periods for .the regulations thereby designed. Legislatures could
adopt sunset provisions as a drafting preference for criminal legislation
going forward. The piecemeal solutions are less than satisfying because
they are not comprehensive and fail to force the legislature to clean up
the old code books. At least they would be a step in the right direction.
This Article suggests that many of the problems in current crimi-
nal codes result from the way it has developed over time. If we con-
sider the criminal law as an organic system like a farm, tended by dif-
ferent farmers with different priorities, each basing their plans for
production on market pressures from different times, we would ex-
pect to find haphazard production. It is not good,. however, for any
farm to have significant areas fall into disuse or suffer from massive
overgrowth. Like any organic system, it needs careful tending and
consistent maintenance to remain viable and productive. But like any
maintenance system, the costs and benefits must be measured care-
fully. Clearcutting or setting massive fires are both ways to deal with
overgrowth, but they may do more harm than good. There are other
possible mechanisms—the criminal code movement of the 1970s and
1980s was an attempt to plow everything under and replant. But as
Paul Robinson and others have noted, the overgrowth has started
again. The Criminal Sunset Amendment imposes a maintenance
schedule from the top, with a clear cost for failing to keep up—the
liw's expiration. In operation, it plainly has a republican bias. It be-
lieves that the earth belongs to the people—the living generation—
and that they are the ones responsible for maintaining it. If one be-
lieves that the criminal law should reflect the current values of "we the
people," and if one believes that democracy is at least better than the
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alternatives, then thinking about how to empower the people's repre-
sentatives and bow to keep them responsive to the governed is worth
doing. Jefferson and Madison both had important insights; stability
and currency of the law will remain in constant tension, but regular
maintenance is a worthwhile exercise.
The absence of a formal mechanism for forcing legislatures
through their paces mandates other ways to bring the criminal law
into accord with modern sensibilities. If the law is out of date, and is
likely to remain that way, then the enforcers must adjust or else lose
perceived legitimacy. Courts and prosecutors make these adjustments
with an additional cost in perceived legitimacy. Although they may be
a necessary accommodation, they are an evolutionary adaptation to
an inherent problem of change in moral commitments over time. If
we do away with prosecutorial discretion or limit courts' ability to in-
terpret statutes in light of modern sensibilities, the hydraulic forces
might force the legislatures to tend to the criminal code. Exploring
the pros and cons of the Sunset Amendment is one way to understand
the array of forces at play within the sytein. I believe that a formal,
process-forcing mechanism is a. more transparent way of dealing with
the problem of changing moral commitments over time. It is more
faithful to the rule of law and more responsive to democratic proc-
esses. It is more likely to lead to perceived legitimacy, and it would
make the law more knowable and, hence, more useful as a norm-
imparting device. Those who believe that democracy is fundamentally
flawed and that introducing elite expertise into the system will ulti-
mately lead to better results are likely to see the current state of the
law as preferable. Legitimate reasons, like the Framers' fear of the
dangers of factions, support that view. Madison and Jefferson would
likely still disagree after watching more than two centuries of practice
under the system they helped design. 1 side with Jefferson.
